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New York City and other municipalities have filed state-law-based nuisance suits 
against fossil fuel companies seeking compensatory damages for the 
consequences of climate change. Previous nuisance claims, filed under federal 
common law, were held to be displaced by federal environmental statutes. 
Defendants have argued that state-law-based claims should likewise be 
preempted. Yet while the enactment of federal regulatory statutes displaces 
federal common law actions for interstate pollution, such enactments do not 
necessarily preempt state common law actions, even where pollution crosses state 
boundaries, as it is more difficult to preempt state common law than it is to 
displace federal common law. In City of New York v. Chevron Corp., however, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded the government 
plaintiffs may not “utilize state tort law to hold multinational oil companies liable 
for the damages caused by global greenhouse gas emissions.” While there may be 
strong policy arguments for this result, the legal basis for this conclusion is weak. 
This article provides background on the use of common law suits to address 
pollution concerns and the history of state-level pollution control measures, 
before describing the current doctrines of displacement and preemption, and 
explaining why the legal arguments for preempting state-law-based climate suits 
are insufficient to justify dismissing these cases, even if equivalent federal 
common law actions would be properly displaced. 
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 New York City is concerned about the threat of climate change.1 Rising temperatures, 
hotter summers, and potential sea-level rise are all anticipated to impose significant costs on the 
                                                 
* Johan Verheij Memorial Professor of Law and Director, Coleman P. Burke Center for Environmental Law, Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law. This paper was prepared for presentation at the Law & Economics 
Center Research Roundtable on Public Nuisance Litigation, May 16-19, 2021. The author would like to thank David 
Bookbinder, Mark DeLaquil, Richard Epstein, Daniel Farber, Michael Gerrard, B. Jessie Hill, Richard Lazarus, Julia 
Mahoney, Thomas Merrill, Andrew Pollis, Cassandra Burke Robertson, Erin Ryan, James Salzman, Catherine 
Sharkey, and participants at the LEC roundtable and a CWRU faculty workshop for comments on various drafts of 
this paper, and Sophia Billias and Jonathan Ziga for research assistance. Any errors, omissions or inanities are solely 
the fault of the author. 
1 See City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 469 (S.D. N.Y. 2018) (noting the conclusions of the New 
York City Panel on Climate Change that “climate change is already affecting New York City and will have a 
significant impact in the future”). 
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city, prompting investments in adaptive measures.2 Like many other municipalities faced with 
climate risks, New York has sought recompense from those who produce and market fossil fuels, 
which are the primary contributor to anthropogenic climate change.3  
 In January 2018, New York filed suit in federal court against several multinational oil 
companies alleging trespass, private nuisance, and public nuisance by producing, promoting and 
selling products (fossil fuels) that contribute to global warming.4 According to City, fossil fuel 
companies have long known of the potential consequences of producing and marketing fossil 
fuels, and therefore bear some responsibility for the abatement and other costs imposed on the 
City due to climate change.5 Specifically, the City filed suit for compensatory damages for both 
past and future costs incurred by the city to protect its property and infrastructure, as well as the 
health, safety, and property of city residents.6 
 Although NYC filed its case in federal court, it sought to press its claims under state law. 
Federal common law claims would be displaced under existing Supreme Court doctrine.7 State 
law based claims, whether characterized as a suit alleging an interstate nuisance or as a product 
                                                 
2 Id. (noting “New York City is exceptionally vulnerable to sea-level rise due to its long coastline” and that “the City 
has been forced to take proactive steps to protect itself and its residents from the dangers and impacts of global 
warming.”). 
3 See Rachel Rothschild, State Nuisance Law and the Climate Change Challenge to Federalism, 27 N.Y.U. ENVTL. 
L.J. 412, 414 (2019) (“each of these lawsuits is seeking monetary damages to deal with the costs of adapting to 
environmental change and coping with disaster events”); Michael A. Livermore, Why Cities Are Suing Oil Giants, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 26, 2018), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2018-06-26/why-
cities-are-suing-oil-giants (“The cities that have joined these lawsuits will face a host of climate change-related 
costs, [and] . . .  are looking to the major oil companies . . .to compensate the taxpayers who are currently holding 
the tab.”). 
4 See Complaint, City of New York v. BP P.L.C., No. 1:18-cv-00182 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2018). 
5 Id. 
6 See City of New York, 325 F.Supp. 3d at 470. 
7 See American Electric Power v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011). 
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liability-based nuisance claim would not.8 At least that is how NYC thought to frame its case. On 
April 1, 2021, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed New York City’s 
claims, becoming the first federal appellate court to conclude that state law-based climate 
nuisance claim were preempted by federal law.9 
 This was not the first climate change nuisance case to reach the Second Circuit. In 2004, 
New York City and several states had brought claims against several of the nation’s largest 
power producers, alleging their greenhouse gas emissions contributed to the public nuisance of 
global warming under federal common law.10 The Second Circuit had looked favorably on those 
claims, rejecting the corporate defendants’ arguments that such federal common law claims were 
displaced by federal law.11 
 New York City’s prior victory was short-lived. In 2011, in American Electric Power v. 
Connecticut, a unanimous Supreme Court held that the Clean Air Act (CAA) displaced federal 
common law nuisance claims for interstate air pollution—in this case, greenhouse gases.12 
Because the CAA authorizes federal regulation of greenhouse gases, and federal common law is 
                                                 
8 Federal preemption of state-law-based nuisance claims is rare in the environmental law context. See Jason J. 
Czarnecki & Mark L. Thomsen, Advancing the Rebirth of Environmental Common Law, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 1, 8-11 (2007). Among other things, courts have rejected preemption claims in cases alleging the marketing and 
sale of fuel additives contributed to a public nuisance, even though the additive was used to comply with federal 
environmental regulations. See, e.g., In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Products Liability Litigation, 725 
F.3d 65 (2nd Cir. 2013). 
9 City of New York v. Chevron Corp., 993 F.3d 81 (2nd Cir. 2021). Most other courts to consider this question, to 
date, have focused on whether federal law is sufficiently preemptive to justify removal of climate-based nuisance 
claims filed in state court. See, e.g., City of Oakland v. BP PLC, 969 F.3d. 895 (2020) (concluding cities state-law 
nuisance claims against fossil fuel producers did not raise a substantial federal question). 
10 See State of Connecticut, et al. v. American Electric Power, No. 04 Civ. 5669, 2004 WL 1685122 (S.D.N.Y. filed 
July 21, 2004).  
11 Connecticut v. American Electric Power, 582 F.3d 309 (2nd Cir. 2009). The court also rejected claims that the 
plaintiffs lacked standing, that their claims were barred by the political question doctrine, or that they had failed to 
state a claim under the federal common law of public nuisance. 
12 564 U.S. 410 (2011). 
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generally disfavored, the justices concluded that federal common law public nuisance claims 
against greenhouse gas emitters were precluded by the CAA.13  
 The AEP decision put a quick end to suits alleging climate change constituted an 
interstate nuisance under federal common law. Efforts to distinguish AEP, in which the plaintiffs 
sought injunctions, from claims seeking damages were unavailing. 14 Yet in closing off one 
avenue of climate change litigation, the Court left open others, including claims that activities 
contributing to climate change could constitute a nuisance or otherwise actionable tort under 
state law.15 It was on this basis that NYC and other local governments filed suit in 2017 and 
2018 against fossil fuel producers seeking to recover for the cost of adapting to climate change 
under state law.16  
                                                 
13 Id. at 415 (“The Clean Air Act and the Environmental Protection Agency action the Act authorizes, we hold, 
displace the claims the plaintiffs seek to pursue.”). 
14 See Native Vill. Of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 858 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The Supreme Court has 
held that federal common law addressing domestic greenhouse gas emissions has been displaced by Congressional 
action. That determination displaces federal common law public nuisance actions seeking damages, as well as those 
actions seeking injunctive relief.”). 
15 See AEP, 564 U.S. at 429 (“None of the parties have briefed preemption or otherwise addressed the availability of 
a claim under state nuisance law. We therefore leave the matter open for consideration on remand.”). The 
opportunity to file climate-based claims was also facilitated by continuing improvements in the science of climate 
attribution. See Michael Burger, Jessica Wentz, & Radley Horton, The Law and Science of Climate Change 
Attribution, 45 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 57, 191-216 (2020). 
16 See, e.g., Complaint, City of Imperial Beach v. Chevron Corp., No. C17-01227 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Jul. 
17, 2017); Complaint for Public Nuisance, City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., No. RG17875889 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. 
Ct. Sep. 19, 2017); Complaint, City of Santa Cruz v. Chevron Corp., No. 17CV03243 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 
Dec. 20, 2017); Complaint, Cty. of  Marin v. Chevron Corp., No. CIV1702586 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Jul. 17, 
2017); Complaint, Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., No. 17CIV03222 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Jul. 17, 
2017); Complaint, Cty. of Santa Cruz v. Chevron Corp., No. 17CV03242 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Jul. 17, 2017); 
Complaint for Public Nuisance, City of San Francisco v. BP  P.L.C., No. CGC-17-561370 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. 
Ct. Sep. 19, 2017); Complaint, City of New York v. BP P.L.C., No. 1:18-cv-00182 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2018); 
Complaint, City of Richmond v. Chevron  Corp., No. C18-00055 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Jan. 22, 2018); 
Complaint and Jury Demand, Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Boulder Cty. v. Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), No. 
2018CV030349 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 17, 2018); Complaint, Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., No. PC-2018-4716 
(R.I. Super. Ct. Providence Cty. July 2, 2018); Complaint, King County v. BP P.L.C., No. 18-2-11859-0 (Wash. 
Super. Ct. May 9, 2018); Plaintiff’s Complaint, Mayor & City of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., No. 24-C-18  -004219 
(Md. Cir. Ct. Jul. 20, 2018 
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While the Congressional enactment of environmental regulatory statutes displaces federal 
common law actions for interstate pollution, such enactments do not necessarily preempt state 
common law actions, even where pollution crosses state boundaries.17 Under longstanding 
precedent, it is more difficult to preempt state common law than it is to displace federal common 
law. And in the years since AEP, lower courts have largely recognized this distinction, generally 
rejecting claims that federal law preempts state-law based nuisance claims, even for interstate 
nuisances so long as claims are based upon the law of the state in which the nuisance 
originated.18 
Having accepted that claims based on federal common law are displaced, plaintiff 
municipalities are grounding their claims in state law, forcing courts to consider whether federal 
law should be interpreted to preclude state law claims the way it has displaced federal common 
law claims.19 As most of these cases have been filed in state courts, carbon industry defendants 
have first sought to have cases removed to federal court before pressing their preemption claims, 
and (at least as of this writing) these efforts have been largely unsuccessful on both counts.20 
                                                 
17 See AEP, 564 U.S. at 423 (“Legislative displacement of federal common law does not require the ‘same sort of 
evidence of a clear and manifest [congressional] purpose’ demanded for preemption of state law.” (cleaned up)). 
18 See, e.g., Merrick v. Diageo Americas Supply, Inc., 805 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 2015); Freeman v. Grain Processing 
Corp., 848 N.W. 2d 58 (Iowa 2014); Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188 (3rd Cir. 2013). See also 
Matthew Morrison & Bryan Stockton, What’s Old Is New Again: State Common-Law Tort Actions Elude Clean Air 
Act Preemption, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. 10282 (2015); Ben Snowden, Clean Air Act Preemption of State-Law Tort 
Claims since AEP v. Connecticut, 16 No. 4 ABA ENVTL. LITIG. & TOXIC TORTS COMMITTEE NEWSL.16 (2015). 
19 See Tracy Hester, Climate Tort Federalism, 13 FIU L. REV. 79, 85 (2019) (noting the new wave of climate suits 
“reflect a conscious strategic choice” to utilize state law in state courts).  
20 See, e.g., City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 969 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2020) (rejecting claim state-law claims raised 
substantial federal question justifying removal); City of Hoboken v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2021 WL 4077541 (D.N.J. 
2021) (remanding nuisance claims); Board of County Commissioners of Boulder County v. Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) 
Inc., 405 F.Supp.3d 947 ((D. Col. 2019) (plaintiffs’ nuisance claims did not arise under or present substantial 
questions of federal law); Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., 393 F.Supp.3d 142 (D.R.I. 2019) (nuisance claims not 
completely preempted by Clean Air Act); County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F.Supp.3d 934 (N.D. Cal. 
2018 (state law nuisance claims not preempted by Clean Air Act). Courts have also considered other bases for 
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New York City, however filed its claim in federal court, prompting a direct adverse holding on 
preemption. 
In City of New York v. Chevron Corp., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
concluded the government plaintiffs may not “utilize state tort law to hold multinational oil 
companies liable for the damages caused by global greenhouse gas emissions.”21  Echoing the 
arguments of a prior district court opinion in a parallel suit filed in California,22 the Second 
Circuit concluded that any such claims necessarily arise under federal common law, that federal 
common law for such claims is displaced by the Clean Air Act, and that the claims are therefore 
precluded.23 In effect, the Court held that state law claims against fossil fuel companies are 
preempted, despite the lack of any preemptive legislative action, implicit or otherwise.  
There are strong policy arguments for the adoption of broad nationwide (if not also 
international) policies to limit greenhouse gas emissions and mitigate climate change. The 
combination of a carbon tax and targeted policies to spur and facilitate climate-related 
innovations, for example, would be superior to a polyglot of state-based lawsuits and monetary 
settlements.24 Yet this would hardly justify the imposition of such a regime by judicial fiat, nor 
                                                 
removal, including the federal officer doctrine. See BP P.L.C. v. Mayor and City of Baltimore, 141 S.Ct. 1532 
(2021). 
21 993 F.3d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 2021). 
22 See City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2018).       
23 The court also concluded that insofar as the suit implicated activities that cause greenhouse gas emissions 
overseas, such claims must also fail.  
24 See, e.g., David A. Dana, The Mismatch between Public Nuisance Law and Global Warming, 18 SUP. CT. ECON. 
REV. 9 (2010) (arguing that treating the global climate as a common-pool resource is likely to be more effective than 
nuisance litigation); Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Allocating Responsibility for the Failure of Global Warming 
Policies, 133 U. PENN. L. REV.  1657, 1659 (2007) (“Regulation through litigation is a less desirable climate change 
policy approach than a sound regulatory policy that reflects society's broad interests.”); SHI-LING HSU, A CASE FOR 
THE CARBON TAX: GETTING PAST OUR HANG-UPS TO EFFECTIVE CLIMATE POLICY (2011) (making the case for a 
carbon tax); Jonathan H. Adler, Eyes on a Climate Prize: Rewarding Energy Innovation to Achieve Climate 
Stabilization, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2011) (discussing measures to facilitate innovation). But see Jonathan 
Zasloff, The Judicial Carbon Tax: Reconstructing Public Nuisance and Climate Change, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1827 
DRAFT – Not for Citation  DRAFT – Not for Citation 
  Page 7 
 
 
does it justify judicial refusal to hear such claims in the absence of actual legislative preemption. 
Whether state law nuisance actions are to be preempted is a choice for Congress to make, and is 
a choice Congress has not yet made. Accepting that the EPA has regulatory authority over 
greenhouse gases,25 there is no legislation preempting state efforts to address the consequences 
of greenhouse gas emissions themselves.26 While other legal doctrines may constrain or 
complicate state common law climate nuisance claims, federal preemption should not be among 
them.27 
Before discussing displacement and preemption, it is worth detailing what it is that would 
be displaced or preempted. Accordingly, Part I begins with a brief sketch of the common law 
environmental protection that preceded and matured alongside the development of environmental 
regulation, including the rise of federal common law actions for interstate pollution. With an eye 
toward preemption, and its role within our federalist system, Part II sketches the system of state 
and local environmental regulation that served as the background for the adoption of federal 
environmental law. While federal environmental laws are quite comprehensive and far-reaching, 
they operate alongside state and local efforts, often in collaborative fashion, and rarely preempt 
                                                 
(2008)  (arguing that successful climate nuisance claims against fossil fuel companies could result in the imposition 
of a de facto carbon tax). 
25 The Supreme Court concluded that the EPA has such authority in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). For 
a critique of that decision, see Jonathan H. Adler, Warming Up to Climate Change Litigation, 3 VA. L. REV. IN 
BRIEF 61 (2007). 
26 Many of the recent suits seek damages to compensate plaintiff jurisdictions for the costs of climate change and the 
need to adapt to such changes. These suits do not seek to impose emission reduction obligations on any fossil fuel 
companies directly. It is certainly possible, however, that when faced with the costs of compensating jurisdictions 
harmed by climate change, some companies may opt to change their behavior so as to reduce their liability. 
27 Depending on how a given climate nuisance claim is pled, it could raise Dormant Commerce Clause or Due 
Process issues insofar as it targets or affects wholly out-of-state conduct. Such questions, however, are wholly 
distinct from the preemption question addressed in this article. Whether a given climate nuisance claim is viable 
under the law of a given state is also a question beyond the scope of this article. For an overview of some of the 
issues involved, see Michael B. Gerrard, What Litigation of a Climate Nuisance Suit Might Look Like, 121 YALE 
L.J. ONLINE 135 (2011). 
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state regulation or litigation. The result is a system of “cooperative federalism” under which state 
governments retain the laboring oar in environmental policy, even if denied control of the tiller. 
Federal law routinely imposes a prescriptive floor of regulatory stringency, but rarely imposes a 
prohibitory ceiling. Federal environmental law largely leaves questions of institutional choice to 
state policy makers as well, including the choice between adopting administrative regulations 
and relying upon common law causes of action to police potentially polluting behavior.  
Parts III and IV discuss displacement and preemption respectively, in the context of 
environmental law. Under current doctrine, displacement and preemption are distinct doctrines 
with distinct rationales and divergent standards. Displacement concerns which branch of the 
federal government is responsible for the development of legal standards. Preemption concerns 
the effect of federal law on the laws of the several states. As federal common law is disfavored 
under Erie,28 the requirements for displacement are rather meek, and satisfied by the mere 
presence of a legislative enactment. In this context, legislative action is understood to reflect the 
legislature’s preference for some alternative to leaving a question for judicial resolution.  
As discussed in Part IV, preemption is quite different from displacement. Unlike federal 
common law, state law is quite favored, as befits a system in which federal powers are defined 
and limited while state police powers are plenary.29 Establishing preemption requires a heavier 
                                                 
28 As the Court declared in Erie (in a bit of overstatement), “There is no federal general common law.”  Erie R. Co. 
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). As the Court noted in AEP, since Erie “a keener understanding developed,” 
564 U.S. at 421, albeit one that has been subject to substantial criticism. See, e.g., Robert R. Gasaway & Ashley C. 
Parrish, In Praise of Erie—And Its Eventual Demise, 10 J. L., ECON. & POL’Y 225 (2013); Caleb Nelson, A Critical 
Guide to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921 (2013); Suzanna Sherry, Wrong, Out of Step, 
and Pernicious: Erie as the Worst Decision of All Time, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 129 (2011); Craig Green, Repressing 
Erie’s Myth, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 596 (2008). For a defense of Erie, see Ernest A. Young, A General Defense of 
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 10 J.L., ECON & POL’Y 17 (2013). 
29 See Ernest A. Young, Federal Preemption and State Autonomy, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, 
NATIONAL INTERESTS 249-70 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds. 2007). For a broader argumenta against 
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lift, grounded in federal supremacy and legislative intent. So while the enactment of federal 
environmental statutes may have broadly displaced the federal common law of interstate 
nuisances, little state common law of nuisance (or other state environmental law, for that matter) 
is preempted by federal environmental regulation. The foregoing suggests a rather 
straightforward application to the problem of climate change: Federal common law actions are 
displaced and state law actions are not preempted. Whatever legal obstacles such suits may face, 
preemption by the federal government is not among them.  
Whether to rely upon federal or state law to address a given environmental concern is a 
vertical separation of powers question. As Part V explains, climate change presents a different 
set of incentives and constraints on state policymaking than states may face in other areas. Such 
incentives and constraints might serve as a policy justification for federal climate legislation and 
the preemption of alternative state approaches. Yet not only has Congress not enacted climate-
specific regulatory measures, the provisions of federal environmental law under which 
greenhouse gases may be controlled are the same provisions that are applied to traditional air 
pollutants. 
In the absence of preemptive federal legislation, state-law based climate nuisance claims 
should not be preempted, even if federal common law actions should be displaced. This would 
seem to be evident from the doctrine, but not every federal court has recognized it. As discussed 
in Part VI, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit misapplied current doctrine in 
holding that New York’s nuisance claims were first, preempted by federal common law, and then 
displaced by the Clean Air Act. As discussed in Part VI, the Second Circuit’s opinion misapplied 
                                                 
federal preemption, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National 
Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
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existing law, relying on mistaken assumptions about the nature of our federal system. Other legal 
arguments for preemption of state-law-based nuisance claims for climate-related damages are 
equally unavailing. While there may be grounds to dismiss state-law-based nuisance claims filed 
by local governments against fossil fuel producers, displacement and preemption are not among 
them. 
To close the paper offers some concluding thoughts and poses questions for further 
consideration as to the proper relationship between federal environmental law and litigation over 
interstate air pollution generally, and climate change in particular.  
 
I. Common Law Environmental Protection  
 
Before there was federal environmental regulation, many environmental problems were 
handled through common law protections of private property from interference by others.30 For 
centuries, the common law doctrines of nuisance and trespass aided landowners who sought to 
protect their property—and, by extension, their persons—from interferences caused by the 
activities of others. Nuisance law, in particular, was a means through which landowners could 
protect against environmental harms.31 
                                                 
30 See generally, Steven J. Eagle, The Common Law and the Environment, 58 CASE WEST. RES. L. REV. 583 (2008); 
see also J.B. Ruhl, Making Nuisance Ecological, 58 CASE WEST. RES. L. REV. 753, 753 (2008) (“Common law 
nuisance doctrine has the reputation of having provided much of the strength and content of environmental law prior 
to the rise of federal statutory regimes in the 1970s.”).” 
31  Louise A. Halper, Public Nuisance and Public Plaintiffs: Rediscovering the Common Law (Part I), 16 ENVTL. L. 
REP. 10292, 10293–94 (1986); G. Nelson Smith III, Nuisance and Trespass Claims in Environmental Litigation: 
Legislative Inaction and Common Law Confusion, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 39, 41–44 (1995).       
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The underlying principle of nuisance in Anglo-American law dates back to at least the 
mid-thirteenth century, when the noted jurist Henry of Bracton wrote that “no one may do in his 
own estate any thing whereby damage or nuisance may happen to his neighbor.”32  So, for 
example, it was not permissible for one landowner to emit noxious odors or fumes onto the land 
of another or to cause a neighbor’s land to be flooded. This principle became embodied in the 
Latin maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, or “Use your own property so as not to harm 
another’s,” which was famously embraced in William Aldred’s Case in 1611.33 
 William Aldred’s case may be ancient history, but the underlying dispute should resonate 
today. A businessman built a hog sty in a residential neighborhood, allegedly fouling the air for 
local residents. When suit was brought, the defendant claimed the plaintiffs were oversensitive—
“one ought not to have so delicate a nose, that he cannot bear the smell of hogs”34—and any 
inconvenience or intrusion was outweighed by the public benefit of hog production. After all, 
“the building of the house for hogs was necessary for the sustenance of man.”35 The court 
rejected this defense, however, on the grounds that no landowner has the right to use his or her 
property in manner that will prevent the quiet enjoyment of other nearby properties. Otherwise 
“good and profitable” uses of property may be enjoined as nuisances where they cause pollution 
                                                 
32 See Elizabeth Brubaker, The Common Law and the Environment: The Canadian Experience, in WHO OWNS THE 
ENVIRONMENT? 88-89 (Peter J. Hill and Roger E. Meiners eds., 1997). By some accounts, the origins of nuisance 
may be traced back to the writ of novel disseisin and 1166. See Julian Morris, Climbing Out of the Hole: Sunsets, 
Subjective Value, the Environment, and the English Common Law, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL L.J. 343, 347-48 (2003). See 
also Daniel R. Coquillette, Mosses from an Old Manse: Another Look at Some Historic Property Cases about the 
Environment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 765-72 (1979). 
33 See 9 Coke 57b, 77 Eng. Rep. 316 (1610).  This case, involving a dispute between a landowner and the owner of a 
neighboring pig sty, is the first known reported case to expressly rely upon this rule for its decision. For more 
background on the case, see Coquillette, supra note __, at 772-777, 
34 9 Coke 58a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 817. 
35 Id. According to Coquillette, “Never before had a defendant so clearly claimed social utility as a defense to a 
nuisance action.” Coquiellete, supra note __, at 775. 
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that prevents others from enjoying the property of their own.36 As Blackstone would describe the 
rule: 
 
[I]f one erects a smelting-house for lead so near the land of another that the vapor and 
smoke kills his corn and grass, and damages his cattle therein, this is held to be a 
nuisance. . . . [I]f one does any other act, in itself lawful, which yet being done in that 
place necessarily tends to the damage of another's property, it is a nuisance: for it is 
incumbent on him to find some other place to do that act where it will be less offensive.'37 
 
Grounded in the sic utere principle, the law of nuisance operated as a powerful constraint 
on potentially noxious land uses for many centuries, at least where the harms were readily 
observable and traceable, and the numbers of properties involved were sufficiently small to avoid 
coordination problems and excessive transaction costs.38  
During the 19th century, many courts were more willing to engage in the sort of balancing 
the court in Aldred’s Case eschewed.39 Nonetheless, nuisance law remained a powerful means of 
constraining polluting activities, as well as encouraging the siting of potentially polluting 
                                                 
36 9 Coke 58b-59a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 821. 
37 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 217-218. 
38 See Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning 
the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 661 (1986) (“Land is such a fundamental natural resource that most 
environmental threat, whether directed at natural resources or public health, can easily be read as interfering with the 
land’s use and enjoyment, and thereby potentially raising private nuisance claims.”). See also WILLIAM H. 
RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, §2.1 at 112-13 (2d. ed. 1994) (“Nuisance actions reach pollution of all physical 
media—air, water, land, groundwater—by a wide variety of means. Nuisance actions have challenged virtually 
every major industrial and municipal activity that today is the subject of comprehensive environmental regulation.”). 
39 See Paul M. Kurtz, Nineteenth Century Anti-Entrepreneurial Nuisance Injunctions – Avoiding the Chancellor, 17 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 621, 656 (1976). 
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activities away from where they might cause harm. During the Progressive Era, for instance, 
anti-smoke activists targeted individual facilities, raising complaints and occasionally filing 
nuisance suits.40 Such suits were often successful.41 The threat of nuisance liability, and a court 
order that could force a facility to clean up or close, encouraged firms to locate potentially 
polluting facilities farther away from residential communities so as to avoid complaints and 
litigation. 
 The law of private nuisance focused on those activities that interfered in the use or 
enjoyment of private land. By contrast, the doctrine of public nuisance developed to address 
those activities which interfered with the rights of the public at large, such as by obstructing a 
highway, disrupting a public market, or fouling the air of the town square.42  Because public 
nuisance actions are filed to protect rights common to the public, they are most often filed by 
public authorities, acting on behalf of the state in its sovereign capacity.43  Those activities 
subject to suit as public nuisances are those also subject to regulation under the sovereign police 
power.44 
 The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines a public nuisance as “an unreasonable 
interference with a right common to the general public.”45  Though it does not provide a precise 
                                                 
40 DAVID STRADLING, SMOKESTACKS AND PROGRESSIVES: ENVIRONMENTALISTS, ENGINEERS, AND AIR QUALITY IN 
AMERICA, 1881-1951 3 (1999). 
41 STRADLING, supra note __, at 41. 
42 See William L. Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997, 998-999 (1966); Thomas W. 
Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 293, 328–29 (2005).  
43 Robert Abrams & Val Washington, The Misunderstood Law of Public Nuisance: A Comparison with Private 
Nuisance Twenty Years After Boomer, 54 ALB. L. REV. 359, 362, 364–65 (1990).      
44 Private parties may also file suits alleging public nuisances, but only if they are able to demonstrate that they have 
suffered a “special injury” to distinguish their interest from that of the public at large. See Abrams & Washington, 
supra note __ at 364. 
45 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B (1977). 
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definition of what would constitute an “unreasonable” interference, the Restatement notes public 
nuisances are typically characterized by one or more of the following characteristics: 1) the 
offending conduct creates a “significant interference with the public health, the public safety, the 
public peace, the public comfort or the public convenience”; 2) the conduct is “proscribed by 
statute, ordinance or administrative regulation”; and 3) the conduct is “of a continuing nature or 
has produced a permanent or long lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know, 
has a significant effect upon the public right.”46  As Professor Thomas Merrill observes, this only 
provides the most general guidance for resolving nuisance claims as it does not, for instance, 
make clear whether courts should balance the degree of harm against the utility of the 
defendant’s conduct or adopt something closer to a strict liability rule.47   
 Although public nuisance claims in federal court are not particularly common, states have 
repaired to the federal common law of interstate nuisance in seeking to reduce or eliminate 
pollution emanating from other jurisdictions.  In the noted case of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper 
Company, for example, the state of Georgia sought relief from the “noxious gas” emitted by 
copper companies in an adjoining state.48  These emissions, Georgia claimed, caused the 
“wholesale destruction of forests orchards and crops” within its territory.49  In an opinion by 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the Supreme Court agreed that Georgia was entitled to relief, 
explaining: 
                                                 
46 Id. 
47 See Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293, 329 (2005).  See 
also International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 496 (1987) (“nuisance standards often are vague and 
indeterminate”); North Carolina ex rel Cooper v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 302 (4th Cir. 2010) (“while 
public nuisance law doubtless encompasses environmental concerns, it does so at such a level of generality as to 
provide almost no standard of application.”). 
48 206 U.S. 230, 236 (1907). 
49 Id. 
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It is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign that the air over its territory 
should not be polluted on a great scale by sulphurous acid gas, that the forests on its 
mountains, be they better or worse, and whatever domestic destruction they have 
suffered, should not be further destroyed or threatened by the act of persons beyond its 
control, that the crops and orchards on its hills should not be endangered from the same 
source.50 
 
In other cases the Supreme Court recognized public nuisance claims against upstream discharges 
of untreated sewage and ocean dumping of waste, among other things.51 
 The gradual adoption of environmental regulations at the local, state and federal level did 
not put an end to nuisance litigation. Far from it. The number of environmental nuisance cases 
continued to rise through the late 20th century, even as environmental regulations at all levels of 
government proliferated.52 Rather than eliminate nuisance litigation, it would appear that 
nuisance claims and environmental regulations were both responses to the same underlying 
cause: An increased demand for action to control the environmental consequences of industrial 
and other activity. And where environmental regulations are absent or inadequate, as often 
occurs, the filing of nuisance suits should be no surprise. 
 
                                                 
50 Id. at 238. 
51 See, e.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901); New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931). 
52 See Karol Boudreaux & Bruce Yandle, Public Bads and Public Nuisance: Common Law Remedies of 
Environmental Decline, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 55, 64 (2002) (documenting a dramatic increase in environmental 
public nuisance cases in both state and federal courts between the 1960s and 1990s). 
DRAFT – Not for Citation  DRAFT – Not for Citation 
  Page 16 
 
 
II. Cooperative Federalism in Environmental Law  
 
While not as old as nuisance law, state and local regulation of pollution-generating 
activities and other environmental concerns long predated the enactment of major federal 
environmental laws. Such regulations were often concerned with locally undesirable land uses or 
activities that could be considered nuisances, but also address some resource conservation 
concerns. By the time of the post-World War II environmental awakening, state and local 
governments had been active in various forms of environmental regulation for decades. The 
groundswell of public support that induced federal legislative action encouraged the adoption of 
more aggressive policies at the state and local level as well.53  
At the same time as Progressive Era anti-smoke activists sought to harness nuisance law, 
local governments began adopting smoke-control ordinances to improve local air quality. As 
environmental historian David Stradling recounts, “the late 1800s and the early 1900s contain 
abundant examples of urban and suburban environmental activism, much of it successful.”54 
Philadelphia, for example, enacted a smoke-control ordinance in 1905, which quickly reduced 
smoke levels in the heart of the city. 55 The City of Brotherly Love was not alone.  By 1920, 
some forty cities had local smoke control ordinances in place. 56  By 1960, the number had more 
                                                 
53 See generally Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 
MD. L. REV. 1141 (1995).   
54 DAVID STRADLING, SMOKESTACKS AND PROGRESSIVES: ENVIRONMENTALISTS, ENGINEERS, AND AIR QUALITY IN 
AMERICA, 1881-1951 4 (1999). 
55 STRADLING, supra note __, at 76. 
56 See Arthur C. Stern, History of Air Pollution Legislation in the United States, 32 J. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL 
ASS’N 44, 44 (1982).   
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than doubled, and by 1970, when the Clean Air Act was enacted, it topped 100.57   County-level 
air pollution control efforts likewise increased dramatically in the post-war period, rising from 2 
in 1950 to 81 in 1970.58  State regulations also followed in much of the country, beginning with 
Oregon in 1951.59  By 1970, every state had an air pollution control program of some sort. State-
level air quality measures adopted in the 1960s include ambient air quality standards in ten states 
and emission standards in several others.60 
A similar story could be told with water pollution. Throughout the country, “local public 
indignation over the filth of local waters” triggered state legislative responses.61  By 1966, every 
state had adopted water pollution legislation of some sort.62  Just as Cleveland residents took the 
lead at beginning to clean the Cuyahoga River before the infamous 1969 fire,63 other 
communities made strides to protect local resources well before meaningful federal regulation 
was adopted. As would be expected, some states’ efforts were clearly more comprehensive and 
more successful than others, and different states had different priorities.  Then, as now, the 
adopted measures were imperfect, and environmental goals were often balanced against other 
concerns. Nonetheless, as the nation’s environmental consciousness blossomed in the post-war 
period, state and local governments began to act. 
                                                 
57 Id. 
58 Stern, supra note __, at 44. 
59 Id. at 47. 
60 Id. at 48. 
61 See, e.g., N. William Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality; Part I: State Pollution 
Control Programs, 52 IOWA L. REV. 186, 234 (1966). 
62 See Hines supra note __, at 215. 
63 See Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a History of Environmental Protection, 14 
FORDHAM ENV’T L. REV. 89, 105–13 (2002).       
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Those federal environmental statutes enacted prior to 1970 were rather limited, largely 
focusing on the conduct of the federal government itself, rather than private industry.64 Yet 
beginning in 1969, Congress began to erect a broad environmental regulatory architecture, 
including the Clean Air Act in 197065 and the Clean Water Act in 1972. 66 These laws, and others 
adopted during the same time period,67 were adopted against the background of state and local 
environmental measures.  
Congress’s environmental lawmaking did not seek to supplant pre-existing state and local 
efforts. Rather, the express purpose of many federal statutes was to supplement incomplete or 
insufficiently protective state and local efforts. As made clear in the findings of the major federal 
environmental statutes, states were to retain their primary role.68 Were that not enough, major 
pollution control laws like the CAA and CWA contained broad savings clauses expressly 
preserving state authority to enact and enforce laws controlling pollution.69 Outside of the 
                                                 
64 See Percival, supra note __, at 1158 (“To the extent that federal law was regulatory in character prior to 1970, the 
primary targets of environmental regulation were federal agencies rather than private industry.”). 
65 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7661f (2000).  It is worth noting that the first federal clean air legislation was enacted in 1955 
(Pub. L. No. 80-159), and amended in 1963, 1965, 1966, and 1967.  With a few exceptions, such as the creation of 
federal emission standards for new automobiles mandated in 1967, the pre-1970 statutes were largely non-regulatory 
in nature.  Although the 1970 Act was itself, technically, a series of amendments to the prior statutes, it is commonly 
referred to as the Clean Air Act, as it provides the foundation for the contemporary regulatory structure. 
66 33 U.S.C. §§ 1252-1385 (2000).  The Clean Water Act is formally known as the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act.  
67 Other major federal environmental laws enacted during this time period include the National Environmental 
Policy Act (1969), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347, the Endangered Species Act (1973), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544, the 
Federal Environmental Pesticide Act (aka, the Federal Insecticide Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 1972), 7 U.S.C. 
§§ 136-136y, the Safe Drinking Water Act (1974), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j, the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (1976), 42 U.S.C. §§6901-6992k, and the Toxic Substances Control Act (1976), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-
2671. 
68 The congressional findings in the Clean Air Act, for example, declare that “air pollution control at its source is the 
primary responsibility of States and local governments.” 42 U.S.C. §7401(a)(3). Even more emphatically, the Clean 
Water provides that “It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities 
and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution.” 33 U.S.C. §1251(b). 
69 The Clean Air Act, at 42 U.S.C. §7416, provides, in relevant part, that:  
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regulation of vehicles and consumer products sold in interstate markets, states largely retained 
the ability to adopt more stringent standards of their own.70  
While federal environmental laws grant expansive regulatory authority to federal 
agencies, most environmental statutes are implemented following a “cooperative federalism” 
model.71  The federal government outlines the contours of a given regulatory program, typically 
through statutory mandates elaborated upon by regulatory measures.72  States are then 
encouraged to implement the program in lieu of the federal government, in accordance with 
federal guidelines.  Provided these standards are met, states are free to tailor the details of their 
                                                 
Except as otherwise provided . . . nothing in this chapter shall preclude or deny the right of any State or 
political subdivision thereof to adopt or enforce (1) any standard or limitation respecting emissions of air 
pollutants or (2) any requirement respecting control or abatement of air pollution; except that if an emission 
standard or limitation is in effect under an applicable implementation plan or under section 7411 or section 
7412 of this title, such State or political subdivision may not adopt or enforce any emission standard or 
limitation which is less stringent than the standard or limitation under such plan or section. 
The Clean Water Act, at 33 U.S.C. §1370, provides that: 
Except as expressly provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall (1) preclude or deny the right of 
any State or political subdivision thereof or interstate agency to adopt or enforce (A) any standard or 
limitation respecting discharges of pollutants, or (B) any requirement respecting control or abatement of 
pollution; except that if an effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, 
pretreatment standard, or standard of performance is in effect under this chapter, such State or political 
subdivision or interstate agency may not adopt or enforce any effluent limitation, or other limitation, 
effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of performance which is less stringent 
than the effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or 
standard of performance under this chapter; or (2) be construed as impairing or in any manner affecting any 
right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters (including boundary waters) of such States. 
70 See Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption in Environmental Law: Formalism, Federalism Theory and Default Rules, in 
FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 178 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds. 
2007) (observing that federal environmental laws “aim to eliminate state regulation where it would undermine the 
efficient scope of markets for particular commercial commodities”). 
71New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (“[W]here Congress has the authority to regulate private 
activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress’ power to offer States the choice of regulating 
that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation. . . . This 
arrangement . . . has been termed cooperative federalism.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)). Statutes that 
employ the cooperative federalism model include the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act, portions of the Safe Drinking Water Act, and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act.   
72 See John Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183, 1184 (1995).  See 
also DENISE SCHEBERLE, FEDERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: TRUST AND THE POLITICS OF 
IMPLEMENTATION (1997). 
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individual programs to accommodate local conditions and concerns.  In most cases the federal 
standards operate as a floor – albeit a highly prescriptive one – and states remain free to adopt 
more stringent measures.73  State programs that meet federal standards are typically eligible for 
federal financial assistance.74  States that fail to adopt adequate programs are not only denied the 
relevant federal funding, they can also be subject to various sanctions and federal preemption of 
their programs.75   
This cooperative model was explicitly adopted so as to ensure continued state 
involvement in environmental protection.76 Though federal policymakers wish to call the shots 
and set major environmental policy priorities, the major environmental laws are structured so as 
to continue to rely upon the ability of state policymakers to identify, implement and enforce 
environmental requirements. The geographic and economic diversity of the nation requires local 
knowledge and expertise that is often unavailable at the federal level.77  Environmental 
                                                 
73 Whether federal intervention discourages greater state or local regulation by altering the incentives faced by state 
and local policymakers is a separate question, explored in Jonathan H. Adler, When Is Two a Crowd: The Impact of 
Federal Action on State Environmental Regulation, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 67 (2007). 
74 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1256 (2000) (authorizing financial support for state water pollution control programs that 
adopt desired pollution control policies) See also Percival, supra note __, at 1173 (noting the use of federal funding 
to encourage land-use planning and solid waste management). 
75 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §7509 (2000) (detailing sanctions for failure to attain National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
under Clean Air Act); see also Percival, supra note __, at 1174 (noting under most environmental laws, the federal 
government will adopt and enforce a federal regulatory program in the absence of a sufficient state program). For a 
discussion of whether these conditions transgress constitutional bounds, see Jonathan H. Adler & Nathaniel Stewart, 
Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional? Coercion, Cooperative Federalism, and Conditional Spending after NFIB v. 
Sebelius (w/ Nathaniel Stewart), 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 671 (2016). 
76 Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our Good Fortune, 54 MD. L. REV. 1516, 1534 
(1995) (“The essence of cooperative federalism is that states take primary responsibility for implementing federal 
standards, while retaining the freedom to apply their own, more stringent standards.”).  
77 See Dwyer, supra note __, at 1218 (noting that “the knowledge necessary to administer any air pollution control 
program . . . can be found only at the local level.”). See also HENRY N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING 
FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 27 (1996) (“Federal regulators never have been and never will 
be able to acquire and assimilate the enormous amount of information necessary to make optimal regulatory 
judgments that reflect the technical requirements of particular locations and pollution sources.”).  This observation is 
based on the insights of Nobel Laureate economist F.A. Hayek, who observed “[t]he knowledge of the 
circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed 
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problems, and their solutions, will vary from place to place, limiting the federal government’s 
ability to adopt nationwide solutions to environmental concerns that are equally applicable to 
multiple parts of the country.78  
As a general matter, Congress was quite explicit in those few instances in which it sought 
to preempt state environmental law-making, whether by state legislatures, agencies, or courts.79 
the Clean Air Act, for instance, makes explicit that various emission control requirements for 
stationary sources and planning requirements for local governments only establish federal floors, 
leaving states with the discretion to pursue more aggressive measures of their own. When it 
comes to the regulation of motor vehicles, however, the Clean Air Act explicitly provides that 
only the federal government and California may impose emission control requirements on cars 
and trucks.80 Likewise, when the Clean Air Act seeks to preempt state and local regulation of 
                                                 
bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess.”  F. A. Hayek, 
The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AMER. ECON. REV. 519, 519-20 (1945).   
78 Stewart, supra note __, at 1266 (noting the “sobering fact” that “environmental quality involves too many 
intricate, geographically variegated physical and institutional interrelations to be dictated from Washington”). 
79 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7543, 7573 (prohibiting states from adopting or enforcing emission control 
standards for aircrafts or new motor vehicles); Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. 2210(n)(2) (2000) (granting original 
jurisdiction to federal district courts for any public liability action arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident). 
Rather than completely preempting state environmental law in a particular area, Congress commonly includes 
preemptive federal requirements for product design or engineering specifications. William W. Buzbee, 
Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1561–64 
(2007) 
80 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2000) (preemption of state automobile emission standards); 42 U.S.C. § 
7545(c)(4)(A) (2000) (preemption of state fuel standards). EPA may waive preemption of emission standards 
adopted by California, subject to certain conditions. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) California’s ability to adopt its own 
standards was a consequence of California adopting vehicle emission controls prior to the adoption of federal 
standards. See E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman & John C. Millian, Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: 
The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L ECON & ORG. 313, 330 (1985); see also Motor & Equip. Mfrs. 
Ass'n, Inc. v. EPA, 627 F.2d 1095, 1101 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (noting that Congress intended California to “act as a 
kind of laboratory for innovation" with regard to the Stale's "pioneering efforts at adopting and enforcing motor 
vehicle emission standards”). 
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emissions from various consumer products, so as to prevent the balkanization of relevant product 
markets, it is also quite explicit about it.81  
Federal intervention is probably most needed to address interstate spillover concerns.  
Yet only a small portion of current federal regulations can be justified on these grounds.82 
Federal regulation of intrastate air and water pollution is more comprehensive than federal 
regulation of interstate spillovers, making it more difficult to argue that such provisions have the 
purpose or effect of preempting state-law-based protections. Moreover, the few provisions of 
federal environmental law targeted at interstate spillovers were rarely invoked in the first three 
decades after the major federal pollution control statutes were adopted.  
While the Clean Air Act contains a few provisions that specifically address interstate 
pollution concerns, the EPA largely ignored these measures for many years.  Indeed, where 
states sought to invoke the Act to obtain relief for upwind contributions to local air pollution, the 
EPA refused to act and federal courts largely validated the federal government’s desire to ignore 
interstate air pollution.83  Only since the turn of the century has the EPA meaningfully responded 
to states seeking to control emissions from upwind states that contribute to downwind 
nonattainment of federal air quality standards.84  The Clean Water Act also authorizes the EPA to 
address transboundary pollution, but here again the federal government has been largely absent, 
                                                 
81 Perhaps paradoxically, other aspects of the Clean Air Act, such as its fuel regulations, facilitate if not actually 
require the balkanization of interstate markets. See generally Andrew P. Morriss & Nathaniel Stewart, Market 
Fragmenting Regulation Why Gasoline Costs So Much (and Why It's Going to Cost More), 72 BROOK. L. REV. 939 
(2007). 
82 See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341 (1998); 
see also Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 NYU ENVTL L.J. 130  
(2005) . 
83 See Merrill, supra note __, at 959; SCHOENBROD, supra note __, at 126. 
84 See Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 
2001). 
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rarely invoking the relevant provisions.85 Policymakers may have voiced concerns about 
interstate externalities when adopting federal environmental statues,86 but such concerns are 
scarcely evident in the environmental provisions of the U.S. Code, and rarely motivated federal 
regulators until relatively recently. While there may be policy arguments for the federal 
government to maintain an aggressive presence in interstate pollution disputes, that is not what 
Congress has done. 
 
III. Displacement  
 
For over a century, states brought interstate pollution disputes to the Supreme Court, 
often under the Court’s original jurisdiction.87 While the total number of cases was not 
particularly significant, the Court considered interstate pollution claims under federal common 
law and, where appropriate, provided relief. If the Court concluded that upstream or upwind 
jurisdictions failed to respect the territory of their downstream or downwind neighbors, the Court 
issued injunctions against pollution sources88 and, in some cases, even ordered states to construct 
                                                 
85 See Merrill, supra note __, at 960-61. 
86 See Esty, supra note __, at 624 n.196 (Congress considered interstate externalities when adopting Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1977). 
87 The Supreme Court first took jurisdiction over an interstate pollution dispute in Missouri v. Illinois. See Missouri 
v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906). For a thorough discussion of this history, 
see Robert Percival, The Clean Water Act and the Demise of the Federal Common Law of Interstate Nuisance, 55 
ALA. L. REV. 717 (2004). For a fuller exploration of the Court’s use of original jurisdiction in environmental cases, 
see Robert D. Cheren, Environmental Controversies “Between Two or More States”, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 105 
(2014). 
88 See, e.g., Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 239 (1907) (issuing an injunction against the discharge 
of noxious gasses that crossed state lines and harmed Georgian land); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 420–21 
(1929) (enjoining the defendants from excessively diverting waters from the Great Lakes to the Chicago Drainage 
Canal for the purpose of sewage disposal); New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473, 476, 482–83 (1931) 
(issuing an injunction restraining New York City from dumping garbage into the ocean). 
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necessary facilities for adequate waste management.89 Upon the adoption of federal 
environmental regulatory statutes, however, this practice came to an end. Resting on the 
assumption that federal common law should be no more than a gap-filler of last resort, the Court 
concluded that the enactment of federal environmental laws eliminated any need for a court-
crafted federal common law of interstate nuisance. Whereas demonstrating preemption of state 
law may difficult, the Court concluded that demonstrating displacement of federal common law 
should be easy.  
 The Court’s change of heart came about in its consideration of a long-running water 
pollution dispute between the state of Illinois and the City of Milwaukee.90 The dispute began 
prior to the enactment of the Clean Water Act. Illinois filed a bill of complaint with the Supreme 
Court alleging that several Wisconsin localities, including the sewage commissions of 
Milwaukee city and county, were discharging pollution into Lake Michigan.91 Specifically, 
Illinois claimed “some 200 million gallons of raw or inadequately treated sewage and other 
waste materials are discharged daily into the lake in the Milwaukee area alone,” creating a public 
nuisance.92 As it had in prior cases, the Court recognized that Illinois’ claims arose under federal 
common law.93 Although Congress had enacted laws “touching interstate waters” and urging 
                                                 
89 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 420–21 (1930) (requiring the Sanitary District of Chicago to 
construct and operate suitable sewage plants); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 805 (1930) (requiring New York 
to build a sewage treatment plant at Port Jervis before diverting water from the Delaware River to the New York 
City water supplies). 
90 See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (Milwaukee I); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. 308 
(1981) (Milwaukee II). See also Percival, supra note __, at 758-65. 
91 The jurisdictions included four Wisconsin cities, the Sewerage Commission of the City of Milwaukee, and the 
Metropolitan Sewerage Commission of the County of Milwaukee. Milwaukee I 406 U.S. at 93. 
92 Id.  
93 Id. at 103 (“When we deal with air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal common 
law.”). Interestingly enough, when Illinois first sought to bring its claims before the Supreme Court, some of the 
justices were skeptical of the claims, and Justice Harry Blackmun thought hearing such claims “will be a big 
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their protection, the Court did not find that these enactments had displaced its responsibility to 
adjudicate the dispute between Illinois and Milwaukee, even though federal law authorized suits 
by the Attorney General for the abatement of pollution.94 
 Relying upon Georgia v. Tennessee Copper,95 and recognizing the “federal interest in a 
uniform rule of decision,”96 the Court accepted the responsibility of adjudicating the dispute and 
considering whether to enjoin the nuisance of which Illinois complained. Yet while citing the 
need for a uniform, federal standard, as opposed to the “varying common law of the individual 
States,”97 the Court also acknowledged that the passage of “new federal laws and new federal 
regulations” could make this role obsolete.98 “But until that comes to pass,” wrote Justice 
Douglas for the Court, “federal courts will be empowered to appraise the equities of the suits 
alleging the creation of a public nuisance by water pollution.”99 
 What Justice Douglas suggested might come to pass did—and right quick. Milwaukee I 
was decided in April 1972. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, what 
we commonly refer to as the “Clean Water Act,” was passed over President Richard Nixon’s 
                                                 
headache for the Court.” See Zasloff, supra note __, at 1844 (quoting Memorandum from Harry A. Blackman to the 
United States Conference (Sept. 16, 1971)). 
94 Id. at 103-04. Indeed, while the authority for the Attorney General to act was longstanding, it had rarely been 
invoked prior to the 1960s. See Adler, Fables, supra note __, at 134. See also William H. Rodgers, Jr., Industrial 
Water Pollution and the Refuse Act: A Second Chance for Water Quality, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 772-74 (1971) 
(discussing how federal authority had previously been understood). 
95 206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
96 Milwaukee I 406 U.S. at 105 n.6. 
97 Id. at 107 n.9. 
98 Id. at 107. While stressing the need for a uniform rule of decision, the Court also acknowledged that equitable 
concerns could justify the consideration of state-specific concerns, including whether one state had voluntarily 
adopted more “strict standards” than did its neighbors. Id.  
99 Id. 
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veto only six months later.100 With this enactment Congress dramatically expanded the federal 
role in water pollution regulation, even if it did not do much to address the particular concern of 
interstate water pollution. This new law, the Court would subsequently hold, provided the 
necessary uniform federal standard for water pollution disputes under federal law, and thus was 
more than enough to displace any need for a federal common law of interstate water pollution. 
 In 1980, the Milwaukee I defendants returned to the Supreme Court seeking relief from 
judicially imposed orders to abate their pollution of Lake Michigan.101 This gave the Court an 
opportunity to consider the implications of the Clean Water Act’s passage and to extricate itself 
from continuing involvement in interstate pollution disputes, and it was an opportunity the Court 
would not pass up.  
 While acknowledging the occasional need to provide a federal rule of decision under 
federal common law in a “few and restricted” instances in the absence of legislative action, the 
Court rejected the idea that resolving interstate disputes—and fashioning and enforcing standards 
under federal common law—was its responsibility.102 Instead, the Court explained, it should be 
guided by the legislature.103 And although nothing in the text or history of the Clean Water Act 
indicated Congress’s intent to displace the Court’s role in adjudicating interstate pollution 
                                                 
100 The Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500 (1972) was enacted in October 1972 following a veto by President 
Nixon. See Clean Water: Congress Overrides Presidential Veto, in CQ ALMANAC 1972, at 11-17 (28th ed. 1973) 
101 See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 311-12. 
102 Id. at 313 (“Nothing in this process suggests that courts are better suited to develop national policy in areas 
governed by federal common law than they are in other areas, or that the usual and important concerns of an 
appropriate division of functions between the Congress and the federal judiciary are inapplicable”). 
103 Id. (“The enactment of a federal rule in an area of national concern, and the decision whether to displace state law 
in doing so, is generally made not by the federal judiciary, purposefully insulated from democratic pressures, but by 
the people through their elected representatives in Congress.”) 
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disputes, the enactment of a comprehensive federal regulatory regime for water pollution 
obviated any need for Court intervention.104 
 Leaning heavily on the idea that federal common law is to be disfavored,105 the Court 
explained it need not wait for Congress to enact a law expressly depriving the judiciary of the 
power to act. Rather, the mere presence of a federal statute occupying the relevant space and 
assigning primary responsibility for pollution control to the executive branch would be 
sufficient.106 As the Court explained, “the appropriate analysis in determining if federal statutory 
law governs a question previously the subject of federal common law is not the same as that 
employed in deciding if federal law preempts state law.107 Whereas the latter requires due regard 
for state prerogatives, “[s]uch concerns are not implicated in the same fashion when the question 
is whether federal statutory or federal common law governs, and accordingly the same sort of 
evidence of a clear and manifest purpose is not required.”108 To the contrary, Justice Rehnquist 
explained, the Court should “‘start with the assumption’ that it is for Congress, not federal 
courts, to articulate the appropriate standards to be applied as a matter of federal law,” and thus 
the presumption is that federal common law should be displaced.109 
 The Court would not affirm that this conclusion applied equally to interstate air pollution 
until deciding American Electric Power in 2011, but the logic of the Court’s displacement 
                                                 
104 Id. at 314 (“when Congress addresses a question previously governed by a decision rested on federal common 
law, the need for such an unusual exercise of lawmaking by federal courts disappears”).  
105 See id. at 312 (“Federal courts, unlike state courts, are not general common law courts and do not possess a 
general power to develop and apply their own rules of decision.”). 
106 Though, as noted above, the field of water pollution control was not entirely fee of federal involvement when 
Milwaukee I was litigated. See infra notes __ and accompanying text. 
107 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 316. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 317. 
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doctrine was clear. Few doubted the principle underlying Milwaukee II would dictate an 
equivalent result in an air pollution case, even one involving greenhouse gases. Indeed, in AEP, 
the Obama Administration did not even try to argue otherwise, its commitment to an aggressive 
climate policy notwithstanding.110 
 The state plaintiffs in AEP brought a federal common law claim of interstate nuisance 
against the nation’s largest emitters of carbon dioxide seeking broad injunctive relief. Although 
litigated in tandem with the suit that would become Massachusetts v. EPA,111 the AEP case 
languished in the lower courts long after Massachusetts was decided.112 Once it reached One 
First Street, however, the case was quickly and easily resolved in a unanimous opinion by Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg. 
Reaffirming the rational of Milwaukee II, Justice Ginsburg explained that whether a 
federal regulatory program displaces preexisting federal common law claims is dependent upon 
the action taken by Congress. The enactment regulatory legislation, in particular, is the 
touchstone of the analysis, not any other indicia of legislative intent, nor not any judicial 
assessment of whether such legislation is effective or sufficient to address the downstream or 
downwind state’s concerns. How (or even whether) such legislation has or would be 
                                                 
110 The Solicitor General’s merits brief urged the Supreme Court to reverse the lower court’s conclusion that 
plaintiffs had standing on prudential, rather than constitutional, grounds, and recommended remand so the Second 
Circuit could reconsider its displacement holding in light of subsequent regulatory events. 
111 It is worth noting that the underlying legal theories in the Massachusetts litigation and AEP litigation operated in 
tandem to place the federal government in a difficult position, as insofar as the federal government argued that the 
EPA lacked authority to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act, this undermined the arguments that 
nuisance claims were displaced. See Jonathan H. Adler, The Supreme Court Disposes of a Nuisance Suit: American 
Electric Power v. Connecticut, 2010-11 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 295, 301-02 (2011). 
112 Indeed, AEP sat at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for an extraordinarily long time after oral 
argument. The court’s decision was eventually issued over three years after oral argument with only two of the 
original panel members participating. The third, Sonia Sotomayor, was by then a justice on the Supreme Court. See 
Connecticut v. Amer. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d 309 (2nd Cir. 2009). 
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implemented by federal regulatory agencies was not the Court’s concern: “The test for whether 
congressional legislation excludes the declaration of federal common law is simply whether the 
statute “speak[s] directly to [the] question” at issue.”113   
Given that the Court had decided four years earlier that the CAA applied to greenhouse 
gases,114 it was rather obvious that federal common law claims against GHG emitters would have 
to be displaced under this test. “As Milwaukee II made clear,” Justice Ginsburg wrote, “the 
relevant question for purposes of displacement is ‘whether the field has been occupied, not 
whether it has been occupied in a particular manner.’”115 And because greenhouse gases were air 
pollutants subject to regulation under the CAA, displacement followed.  As Justice Ginsburg 
explained,  
 
the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any federal common law 
right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants.  
Massachusetts made plain that emissions of carbon dioxide qualify as air pollution 
subject to regulation under the Act . . . And we think it equally plain that the Act ‘speaks 
directly’ to emissions of carbon dioxide from the defendants’ plants.116 
 
                                                 
113 AEP, 564 U.S. at 424 (cleaned up). 
114 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
115 AEP, 564 U.S. at 426 (quoting Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 324). 
116 Id. at 424. 
DRAFT – Not for Citation  DRAFT – Not for Citation 
  Page 30 
 
 
The “critical point,” Justice Ginsburg explained, was that “Congress delegated to EPA the 
decision whether and how to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions from power plants,”117 not 
whether the resulting regulations were effective or desirable.118 Indeed, Justice Ginsburg noted, 
were EPA to adopt inadequate regulations, or even to “decline to regulate carbon-dioxide 
emissions altogether,” it would not matter for displacement purposes.119  Even if the Clean Water 
Act could be said to impose a more comprehensive system of effluent controls than the CAA, 
this too was irrelevant, for “[o]f necessity, Congress selects different regulatory regimes to 
address different problems.”120   
 In enacting the CAA, as interpreted in Massachusetts v. EPA, Congress made the scope 
and stringency of GHG emission controls something for the EPA to determine in the first 
instance. Should states or private groups disagree with the EPA’s policy conclusions, or believe 
that the EPA’s regulations are insufficiently stringent, they would retain the ability to petition the 
agency or file suit in federal court, much as the states and environmentalist groups did in 
Massachusetts.  What they could not do is seek to transfer authority over emission controls from 
the political branches to the courts through the use of federal common law. 
                                                 
117 Id. at 426.  To this, Justice Ginsburg added, somewhat cheekily, “Congress could hardly preemptively prohibit 
every discharge of carbon dioxide unless covered by a permit. After all, we each emit carbon dioxide merely by 
breathing.” Id. 
118 There are plenty of reasons to believe EPA regulation of greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act is not 
desirable.  See Jonathan H. Adler, Heat Expands All Things: The Proliferation of Greenhouse Gas Regulation under 
the Obama Administration, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 421 (2011). Nor is such regulation likely to be a 
particularly efficient way to reduce GHG emissions. See Jonathan H. Adler, The Legal and Administrative Risks of 
Climate Regulation, 51 ENVTL. L. REP. 10485 (2021). 
119 AEP, 564 U.S. at 426 (“As Milwaukee II made clear, however, the relevant question for purposes of displacement 
is ‘whether the field has been occupied, not whether it has been occupied in a particular manner.’” (citation 
omitted)). 
120 Id. 
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The Court’s opinion emphasized that federal common law is a disfavored remedy.  
“There is no federal general common law,” the opinion noted, quoting Erie Railroad v. 
Tompkins.121 Rather, most questions governed by the common law are left to the states.  Federal 
common law is reserved for “’subjects within national legislative power where Congress has so 
directed,’” such as in the case of antitrust law, or “where the basic scheme of the Constitution so 
demands,” such as where it is necessary to resolve interstate disputes and Congress has not 
addressed the concern through legislation.122 Interstate air and water pollution could be governed 
by federal common law, but only in the absence of regulatory legislation.  The federal common 
law of interstate nuisance is thus a contingent backstop -- a means of filling interstices insofar as 
is necessary to enable states to safeguard their sovereign interests in their own territory.  Yet as 
the Court had held in Milwaukee II, “when Congress addresses a question previously governed 
by a decision rested on federal common law, the need for such an unusual exercise of law-
making by federal courts disappears.”123 
 Whereas the Court has adopted (though not always applied) a presumption against the 
preemption of state law causes of action, no such presumption applies with displacement.  If 
anything the constitutional structure would warrant a “special presumption” against the use of 
federal common law.124  Preemption of state law must be clearly shown so as to protect the 
states’ sovereign interests within the federal system of dual sovereignty.125  No such interest 
                                                 
121 Id. at 420 (quoting Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)). 
122 Id. (citation omitted). 
123 451 U.S. at 314. 
124 See Merrill, supra note __ at 314. 
125 See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 569 (2009) (““in all pre-emption cases ... we start with the assumption that 
the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and 
manifest purpose of Congress.”). 
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protects the policymaking power of the federal courts. “[I]t is primarily for the office of 
Congress, not the federal courts, to prescribe national policy in areas of special federal interest,” 
Justice Ginsburg explained for the Court.126  Thus, whereas the justices routinely disagree and 
divide over the preemptive effect of various federal laws, they were of one mind on the question 
of displacement, unanimously rejecting the use of federal common law to control emissions 
already subject to administrative control under federal law, while leaving the question of CAA 
preemption of state law based suits to another day.127 
 
IV. Preemption  
 
The enactment of a federal statute that “speaks directly” to the issue at hand may be 
sufficient to displace federal common law. Far more is required to preempt state law.128 Federal 
common law may be disfavored, but so too is the federal preemption of state law. The 
displacement of federal common law implicates a different legal standard than does the 
preemption of state-law-based claims.129  
As a constitutional matter, Congress has the power to preempt state law, as federal law is 
supreme.130 The question in preemption cases is whether Congress has, in fact, preempted state 
                                                 
126 AEP, 564 U.S. at 423-24. 
127 Id. at 429. 
128 See Zasloff, supra note __, at 1852 (“displacement of federal common law hardly implies the preemption of state 
common law”).  
129 See Merrill, supra  note __ at 314. 
130  See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (providing federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in 
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”). Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, “Congress has the power to preempt state law.” Arizona v. 
United States, 567 U.S. 387, 397 (2012). 
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law.131 This is not to be presumed. As a general matter, preemption will not be found unless the 
Court concludes preemption “was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress”132 or that “a 
scheme of federal regulation . . . [is] so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that 
Congress left no room for the states to supplement it.133  This more stringent standard protects 
the states’ sovereign interests in maintaining their police powers free of federal interference.134 
 Federal preemption comes in two forms, express and implied.  Express preemption is 
straightforward.  Where Congress, or a federal agency, explicitly preempts state laws on a given 
subject, states are barred from adopting and enforcing their own regulations.135  Yet Congress 
need not be so explicit for courts to find preemption.  Preemption may be implied either “where 
the scheme of federal regulation is so persuasive as to make reasonable the inference that 
Congress left no room for the states to supplement it,”136 (so-called “field preemption”) or where 
state and federal law conflict or compliance with state law would obstruct, if not preclude, 
                                                 
131 See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (“the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.” (cleaned 
up)). 
132 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
133 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm., 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983). 
134 See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (“This assumption provides assurance that ‘the 
federal-state balance’ will not be disturbed unintentionally by Congress or unnecessarily by the courts.”); see also 
Medtronic, Inc., v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 488 (1996) (plurality opinion) (preemption is “a serious intrusion into state 
sovereignty”). 
135 See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 
(1983) (“It is well established that within Constitutional limits Congress may preempt state authority by so stating in 
express terms.”). 
136 Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992). 
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compliance with federal law (so-called “conflict preemption”).137 In all such instances, 
Congressional intent is “the ultimate touchstone” of preemption analysis.138 
Although courts may find federal preemption where Congress has not made its intent to 
preempt state law explicit, they are generally reluctant to do so.139 Explicit statutory language 
will do the trick, but other sources of statutory meaning may require a heavier lift. Likewise, 
there is no question that federal law must trump when state and federal requirements directly 
conflict, but mere difference in policy or purpose is unlikely to demonstrate a legislative intent to 
preempt state lawmaking.  
Preemption operates to prevent state regulatory activity, whether through state-level 
administrative regulations or the state’s common law.  The net effect of federal preemption is for 
there to be less regulation than there would have been otherwise.140  Federal laws precluding 
state regulation of automobile or oil tanker design mean that manufacturers need only comply 
with one regulatory standard.  Federal regulations in such cases serve as a regulatory “floor” and 
a regulatory “ceiling” at the same time.  In other cases, preemption may serve to ensure that there 
is no regulation of a given type or governing particular subject matter, as where federal law 
precludes states from adopting particular rules, but the federal government does not adopt rules 
                                                 
137 Id. 
138 Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); see also CSX Transp. V. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993) 
(courts should “focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ 
preemptive intent”). 
139 See, e.g., Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, __ U.S. __ (2018). 
140 See PAUL TESKE, REGULATION IN THE STATES 15 (2004) (noting federal preemption has often been “designed to 
facilitate greater total deregulation” (emphasis in original)). In some cases the purpose of federal preemption is to 
replace one type of regulation with another.  This still results in less regulation than if the federal regulation was 
adopted in addition to the state regulation.  The effects of preemption across states may not be uniform, however.  A 
federal statute that imposes a federal standard when only a handful of states have regulated will increase regulation in 
some jurisdictions at the same time that it reduces regulation by preempting preexisting rules elsewhere. 
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of its own.141  Where implied preemption is found, this will typically preclude any state or local 
regulation whatsoever.142  Where Congress explicitly preempts state regulation, however, the 
scope of the preemption usually will be limited to the extent provided for in the statutory text. 
Given that preemption generally operates to reduce aggregate regulatory burdens, it 
should be no surprise that federal preemption of state environmental regulatory standards is often 
sought by business interests seeking to establish regulatory uniformity, a “ceiling” on regulatory 
stringency, or both.143 Federal preemption of state automotive emission regulations, for example, 
resulted from lobbying by U.S. automakers fearing the potential for different emissions standards 
to be adopted in different states – and believing that federal standards would be less stringent 
than those developed in the states.144  This is not to say that there are not sometimes economic 
justifications for preempting variable state standards with a single federal standard, only to note 
that this pressure for federalization often comes from industry. 
 The mere adoption of a federal regulatory standard that operates as a regulatory “floor” 
does not necessarily preempt state regulation as a legal matter (though it may well have that 
                                                 
141 The most obvious example, albeit a case of constitutional rather than statutory preemption, occurs under the 
“dormant commerce clause.”  States are precluded from adopting measures that discriminate against out-of-state trade 
not because it is assumed that such regulations will be adopted by Congress.  Rather, there is a constitutional 
presumption against the adoption of such rules by any level of government, though Congress does retain the authority 
to adopt laws limiting the flow of interstate commerce or even delegating authority to the states to adopt such measures 
themselves.  This division of authority “creates obstacles to states’ enacting laws that are more protective of the 
environment.” RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 38 (2004). 
142 See Weiland, supra note __, at 258-59. 
143 See Weiland, supra note __, at 242 (“By creating a ceiling, environmental laws may allow the private sector to 
operate within a predictable and uniform environment”).  Similar arguments have been used to support federal 
preemption of state regulations and tort suits in other areas as well.  See, e.g., Caroline E. Mayer, Rules Would Limit 
Lawsuits, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2006 at D01 (preemption by Consumer Product Safety Commission); Gary Young, 
FDA Strategy Would Preempt Tort Suits, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 1, 2004 (preemption by food & Drug Administration). 
144 See Elliott et al., supra note __.  For other examples of this phenomenon, see ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC 
COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds. 1992); POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM: 
GOING BEHIND THE GREEN CURTAIN (Terry L. Anderson, ed. 2000). 
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practical effect).145  For example, a federal regulation imposing emission limitations on an 
industrial facility will not necessarily preempt a less stringent or differently structured state 
regulation governing emissions from the same facility.  As a practical matter, regulated facilities 
are required to meet the more stringent standard, but the existence of two standards does not 
mean the two conflict. Meeting the more demanding requirement will, in most cases, satisfy the 
less stringent one as well.146 If permits are required from both federal and state agencies for 
facility operation, then both permits are required even if compliance with one should make 
compliance with the other a foregone conclusion, unless the less stringent standards are explicitly 
or otherwise preempted by the federal regulation.147 Conflict preemption only occurs if, for some 
reason, compliance with both permits is impossible, such as would occur if state law required the 
installation of a type of pollution control that federal law prohibited, or that could not be installed 
in a manner that would allow for compliance with federal law as well. 
 As noted above, most preemption in environmental law occurs with the regulation of 
products that are manufactured for sale in interstate commerce.148  For example, section 209(b) 
of the Clean Air Act prohibits states from adopting “any standard relating to the control of 
                                                 
145 For a more in-depth discussion of how regulatory floors may place downward pressure on state regulatory 
standards, see Jonathan H. Adler, When Is Two a Crowd?: The Impact of Federal Action on State Environmental 
Regulation, 31 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 67, 94-106 (2007). 
146 An exception to this will be if the standards are defined in terms that require the adoption of particular control 
technologies or methods, in which case compliance with one standard might well preclude and conflict with 
compliance with the other. 
147 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (preempting state enforcement of emission standards less stringent than existing federal 
standards). 
148 Ann Carlson, Federalism, Preemption and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281, 306 (2003) 
(“environmental regulation – in which both the states and the federal government play an active role – frequently 
raises preemption questions”). 
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emissions from new motor vehicles.”149  The Energy Policy Conservation Act preempts any state 
regulation of automotive fuel economy.150  Other preemption provisions can be found in the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act,151 and the Toxic Substances Control Act,152 
among other statutes.   
 As also noted, the structure of most federal pollution control laws is to establish a 
prescriptive federal floor, invite state participation in the administration and enforcement of 
federal standards, while also leaving room for states to adopt more stringent requirements where 
state policymakers conclude local conditions or preferences warrant.153 This is particularly true of 
the CAA which, in important respects, is less prescriptive than the CWA.154 These laws both 
contain broad (if not overly specific) savings clauses, and include no language presuming to 
dictate the form or nature of state regulatory measures. Just as the CWA and CAA leave room 
for states to adopt more stringent controls on air and water pollution through legislation and 
regulation, they also leave room for states to impose more stringent requirements on facilities 
                                                 
149 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a).  There are exceptions to this rule.  The EPA may waive preemption of emission standards 
adopted by California, subject to certain conditions.  42 U.S.C. § 7543(b).  Where the EPA has approved a waiver for 
California, other states may adopt the California rule.  In all cases, however, the other 49 states may not adopt a “third” 
standard.  The Clean Air Act contains similar provisions governing standards for gasoline.  42 U.S.C. § 211(c)(4). 
150 49 U.S.C. § 32919(a).  Unlike with emission standards, there is no conditional exemption for California. 
At the time of this writing there is also litigation concerning whether another provision of EPCA, 42 U.S.C. 
§6297, preempts local ordinances that ban new natural gas hookups. See Calif. Rest. Ass’n v. Berkeley, 2021 WL 
2808975 (July 7, 2021). 
151 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b).  There has been a significant amount of litigation about the scope of preemption under this 
provision, in part because FIFRA also contains a savings clause at 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a).  See generally Alexandra B. 
Klass, Pesticides, Children’s Health Policy, and Common Law Tort Claims, 7 MINN. J. L. SCIENCE & TECH. 89 (2005). 
152 15 U.S.C. § 2617. 
153 See infra Part II. 
154 The CWA prohibits all discharges of pollutants from point without a permit, which is often obtained from s state 
agency exercising delegated authority to administer the CWA. Under the CAA, by contrast, the baseline default is 
the opposite: Emissions are presumptively allowed unless subject to a relevant state or federal regulatory standard. 
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through the state common law of both public and private nuisance.155 In the absence of a 
preemptive legislation, instrument choice is also left to state policy makers. 
 The recent case of Merrick v. Diageo Americas Supply, Inc. is illustrative.156 In Merrick, 
local landowners complained that ethanol emissions from a whiskey distillery caused the growth 
of “whiskey fungus” on their properties.157 Although it was undisputed that the plant’s emissions 
were within the limits set by relevant federal, state, and local regulations,158 the U.S. Court of 
Appeals readily concluded that the Clean Air Act did not preclude the plaintiffs from pursuing 
nuisance claims against the plant, any more than the satisfaction of federal emission standards 
would preclude the state from adopting more stringent regulations. “State courts are arms of the 
‘State,’ and the common law standards they adopt are ‘requirement[s] respecting control or 
abatement of air pollution,” the court explained, rejecting any claim that the CAA would preempt 
state common law nuisance suits while not preempting state regulations.159 This conclusion was 
supported by both the CAA’s text and its purpose.160 It is also the approach most lower federal 
courts have taken.161 
                                                 
155 Some courts have held that common law nuisance actions are preempted as a matter of state law, but this presents 
a separate question from whether such actions are preempted by federal law.  
156 805 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 2015). 
157 See Merrick v. Diageo America’s Supply, Inc., 5  F. Supp. 3d 865, 867-68 (W.D. Ky. 2014). 
158 Id. at 868. 
159 805 F.3d at 690. 
160 Id. at 691 (“Allowing states to apply their common law to emissions advances the Act’s stated purposed by 
empowering states to address and curtail air pollution at its source.”). 
161 See, e.g., Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188 (3rd Cir. 2013) (CAA does not preempt class action 
nuisance claims for air pollution); Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario v. City of Detroit, 874 
F.2d 332, 342 (6th Cir. 1989) (“nothing in the [Clean Air] Act bars aggrieved individuals from bringing a nuisance 
claim pursuant to the law of the source state”). See also Freeman v. Grain Processing Corp., 848 N.W. 2d 58 (Iowa 
2014) (rejecting Clean Air Act preemption claim). See also Mathew Morrison & Bryan Stockton, What’s Old Is New 
Again: State Common-Law Tort Actions Elude Clean Air Act Preemption, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. 12082 (2015). 
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 That the federal pollution control laws do not preempt intrastate nuisance claims does not 
necessarily mean that interstate pollution claims are not preempted. After all, prior to Milwaukee 
II, any such claims would have been brought under the federal common law, and now such 
federal common law claims are displaced.  
 The Supreme Court addressed this question shortly after Milwaukee II in International 
Paper Co. v. Ouellette, concluding that while federal common law claims for interstate water 
pollution are displaced under Milwaukee II, this did not leave downstream states without 
nuisance-based remedies.162 Even though the Court had held previously (in Milwaukee I) that 
nuisance claims for interstate pollution arose under federal common law, and (in Milwaukee II) 
that the CWA displaced such federal common law, Ouellette held that state common law actions 
remained insofar as they were not preempted by the Act. Turning to the question of preemption, 
the Court recognized that state law claims based upon the law of the plaintiff-state were 
preempted, as conflicting with the CWA, but state law claims based upon the law of the source 
state were not.  
Recognizing that the CWA allowed states to impose more stringent standards on 
pollution sources within their jurisdiction, and that common law could be the source of such 
standards, the Court saw nothing in the act that would preclude downstream states from seeking 
to take advantage of whatever standards apply to sources of pollution in other states.163 “Because 
the Act specifically allows source States to impose stricter standards,” the Ouellette Court 
                                                 
162 479 U.S. 481 (1987). 
163 Id. at 814. 
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explained, “the imposition of source-state law does not disrupt the regulatory partnership 
established by the permit system.”164 
The principle underlying Ouellette is that states may not seek to extraterritorialize their 
environmental preferences through nuisance litigation, but they may seek protection from an 
upstream state’s failure to enforce its own environmental standards to sources of interstate 
pollution.165 This means that a state can adopt an environmental standard internally for the benefit 
of its own citizens without also committing to provide the same degree of protection to those in 
downstream states. Thus insofar as federal environmental regulation fails to account adequately 
for the interests of downstream states, Ouellette preserves a limited means of protecting their 
interests, by preventing upstream states from acting opportunistically at the expense of those 
downstream. 
As the CAA contains a savings clause that is quite similar to that contained in the Clean 
Water Act,166 there is no reason the principle articulated in Ouellette should not apply equally in 
the air pollution context. If anything, the CWA is more prescriptive than the CAA, and the 
CAA’s savings clause is, if anything, more expansive. There is also no statutory basis to think 
this principle would not also apply to climate change. Greenhouse gas emissions are subject to 
regulation under the CAA, but to no greater extent than other pollutant emissions for which 
nuisance actions are not preempted. There may be sound policy reasons to treat greenhouse gases 
differently, as discussed in the next section, but this is a determination that should be made by 
                                                 
164 Id. at 815. 
165 For a thorough exploration of cross-boundary pollution concerns, see Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for 
Transboundary Pollution 46 DUKE L.J. 931 (1997). 
166 Compare 33 U.S.C. §1365(e) and 33 U.S.C. §7604(a)(1). 
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legislators, not judges. Congress has yet to enact legislation distinguishing greenhouse gas 
emissions for the purposes of federal regulation, so there is no basis for courts inventing or 
embracing such a distinction on their own. 
Some have suggested that all interstate pollution claims should be preempted so as to 
prevent opportunistic behavior.167 After all, states have every incentive to capture benefits and 
export costs onto other jurisdictions, and whichever state’s law controls an interstate dispute may 
seek to revise its law accordingly. If a downstream state can sue an upstream neighbor under the 
downstream state’s laws, the downstream state has an incentive to adopt more stringent 
requirements and export the costs of pollution control onto its upstream neighbor. Conversely, if 
the upstream state’s law controls, there is an incentive to relax its standards, so as to capture the 
benefit of polluting activity, while exporting the costs downstream. This may be accomplished 
by adopting lax nuisance standards or, perhaps, by adopting a permit-based pollution control law 
that preempts state law nuisance claims.168 A well-designed uniform federal rule can restrain 
such opportunistic behavior.  
Accepting this assessment of the incentives created by such a rule, it does not establish 
that the preemption of all interstate nuisance claims would be preferable to the Ouellette rule. 
Under complete preemption, downstream states would be left at the mercy of upwind 
jurisdictions and federal regulators. In practice, this has meant that the interests of downstream 
jurisdictions have been under-protected, and often ignored. Under the Ouellette rule, by contrast, 
the downstream jurisdiction has an added opportunity to protect its interests, even if only by 
                                                 
167 See Merrill, Preemption in Environmental Law, supra note __ at 180-81.  
168 See, e.g., North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. TVA, 615 F.3d 291, 309-10 (4th Cir. 2010) (concluding that Alabama 
and Tennessee law preclude nuisance suits against permitted facilities).  
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limiting the ability of upstream jurisdictions to expose downstream jurisdictions to levels of 
pollution the upstream jurisdictions would not accept for themselves. In short, the Ouellette rule  
increases the protection of downstream and downwind jurisdictions without magnifying the risk 
of opportunistic behavior by those same jurisdictions, as they cannot impose standards on 
upstream jurisdictions that are more constraining than the upstream jurisdictions would impose 
upon themselves for the benefit of their own residents.. Much like the intrastate nuisance actions 
that have not been preempted, nuisance actions for interstate pollution would reinforce the 
purpose of federal pollution control laws without exposing sources to the risk of potentially 
conflicting regulatory requirements.  
 
V. Climate Change  
 
Is climate change different than other environmental problems? It certainly is; it’s “super 
wicked.”169 One question is whether these differences justify a departure from traditional 
approaches to preemption. A second is whether Congress has decided to treat climate change 
differently.  
Global climate change is anything but a local or regional problem. To the contrary, global 
climate change is just that – a global environmental concern. As a consequence, the traditional 
arguments for allowing state and local governments a relatively free hand to protect their own 
backyards may not apply with equivalent force. Under principles of subsidiarity, the global 
                                                 
169 See Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the 
Future, 94 CORNELL .L. REV. 1153, 1160 (2009)(explaining why climate change may be understood as a “super 
wicked” problem). 
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nature of climate change would counsel greater centralization of policy decisions into national, if 
not international, hands, and less authority for state and local governments. 
State or local jurisdictions wishing to combat global climate change are confronted with 
an archetypal “commons” problem.170  The global climate is a vast global commons to which 
everyone contributes greenhouse gas emissions.  Emissions anywhere on the globe contribute to 
the increase in atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases and the eventual warming of the 
atmosphere.  Any state that reduces emissions within its jurisdiction will bear the costs of such 
reductions, but not reap equivalent benefits.  Whatever benefits accrue from greenhouse gas 
emission controls accrue globally.171  As a consequence, states have every incentive to “free 
ride” on the efforts of their neighbors, rather than suffer costs that will yield few internal 
benefits.  Absent cooperation or the imposition of federal (or international) requirements, state 
and local efforts are unlikely to provide anything approaching the optimal level of greenhouse 
mitigation measures.172 
The disincentive for states to take meaningful action to address climate change are even 
greater than in the typical commons context, however.  No state, acting alone, is even capable of 
adopting emission controls capable of making a dent in global emissions, let alone global 
atmospheric concentrations, of greenhouse gases.173  Even working together, states are not 
                                                 
170 See generally, Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968) (describing the commons 
problem). 
171 See Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 
1961, 1965 (2007) (“local abatement actions pose local costs, yet deliver essentially no local climate benefits.”). 
172 Wiener, supra note __, at 1962 (“local action is not well suited to regulating mobile global conduct yielding a 
global externality”). 
173 Wiener, supra note __, at 1966 (“no state could effectively control its own ambient level of carbon dioxide or 
other GHGs, because that ambient level is determined by the worldwide concentration of GHGs in the 
atmosphere.”); Kirsten H. Engel & Barak Y. Orbach, Micro-Motives for State and Local Climate Change Initiatives, 
2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 119 (2008). 
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capable of reducing projected climate change and its anticipated effects to any meaningful 
degree.  This may help explain why outside of California, most state-level climate change 
policies until relatively recently have been largely symbolic or structured so as to advantage in-
state interests.  Few imposed meaningful and enforceable emission targets in the short term,174 
though  this has started to change as the need for climate action has increased.    
In the case of a nationally or globally dispersed pollutant, state regulation will often be 
less efficient than available alternatives.  Localized measures are also likely to be more costly, 
and less cost-effective, than national measures.  A local cap-and-trade system, for example, will 
cover a more limited set of sources, and fewer savings opportunities, than a national system with 
a broader base.175  Subjecting businesses to a variety of state standards may also be less efficient 
than a standardized federal regulatory regime.176  
States are more likely to adopt meaningful emission reductions if they can externalize the 
costs of such measures on other jurisdictions. Such regional rent-seeking has been well-
documented in environmental law, and almost certainly occurs in the climate context as well.  In 
the context of public nuisance suits, it is reasonable to fear that state officials who file such suits 
get the political benefits of appearing to take action against climate change, without having to 
bear the costs of imposing economic burdens on in-state firms.    
                                                 
174 See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note __, at 1522 (“Few states have set clear emissions reduction targets, and 
fewer still have designed policies to achieve them.”). 
175 Wiener, supra note __, at 1967 (nothing a national emissions control regime “forfeits the greater cost savings 
obtainable in a larger allowance trading market encompassing more countries.”) 
176 DeShazo & Freeman, supra note __, at 1531 (“Firms operating in multiple states may well find that the states are 
adopting different approaches to achieve the same objective, making compliance confusing and potentially costly.”); 
McKinstry & Peterson, supra note __, at __; Weiner, supra note __, at 1974. 
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Allowing individual states to act as environmental “laboratories” can produce useful 
information about the relative cost-effectiveness of various mitigation measures.177  If states are 
free to experiment with competing policy designs, other states and the federal government can 
learn from state policy successes.  Several federal environmental statutes are modeled, at least in 
part, on state programs.178  Even where such experiments fail, useful information will result.179  
Experience in other contexts has shown that interjurisdictional competition can encourage policy 
innovation as policymakers seek to meet the economic, environmental and other demands of 
their constituents.180  In this way, state experimentation in the climate context could improve 
federal climate policies. 
Some advocates of more aggressive climate policy measures note that the adoption of 
state environmental measures has often prompted the enactment of federal policies.  If a state 
initiative is particularly successful, it may encourage federal regulation.  Even if state measures 
                                                 
177 Some scholars have questioned the value of such experimentation. See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore, The Perils of 
Experimentation, 126 YALE L.J. 636 (2017); Charles W. Tyler & Heather K. Gerken, The Myth of the Laboratories 
of Democracy Tyler, (August 9, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3902092 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3902092. Interestingly enough, these critiques do not engage much with the empirical 
literature on state experimentation. See, e.g., PAUL TESKE, REGULATION IN THE STATES (2004). For a review of the 
literature in the context of environmental policy, see Daniel L. Millimet, Environmental Federalism: A Survey of the 
Empirical Literature, 64 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 1669 (2014); see also see also Bruce G. Carruthers & Naomi R. 
Lamoreaux, Regulatory Races: The Effects of Jurisdictional Competition on Regulatory Standards, 54 J. ECON. LIT. 
52 (2016); Wallace E. Oates, A Reconsideration of Environmental Federalism, in RECENT ADVANCES IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 1, 11-17 (John A. List & Aart de Zeeuw eds., 2002) (summarizing empirical 
literature). 
178 See Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Laboratories for Local Solutions for Global Problems: State, Local and Private 
Leadership in Developing Strategies to Mitigate the Causes and Effects of Climate Change, 12 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 15, 16 (2004) (citing examples of federal environmental laws modeled on state predecessors). 
179 See TESKE, supra note __, at 240 (noting that even when state experiments “fail, they provide important 
information for other states and for national policy”); Robert B. McKinstry, Jr. & Thomas D. Peterson, The 
Implications of the New “Old” Federalism in Climate-Change Legislation: How to Function in a Global 
Marketplace when States Take the Lead, 20 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 61, __ (2007) (“An 
innovation in a particular state that fails will have less of an impact on the national economy than a federal 
experiment that fails. Innovative state programs can provide examples of what to do or what not to do.”). 
180 See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. OF POL. ECON. 416 (1956).   
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are not so successful, they may still create incentives for federal action, even if only to preempt 
state rules with a uniform federal standard.181  As has occurred in the past, state greenhouse gas 
regulations could prompt industry support for national standards that would preempt variable 
state controls.182 Indeed, the prospect of nuisance suits themselves may prompt support for 
federal legislative action.  
 The above suggests there are serious arguments for centering climate change policy at the 
federal level, but these are policy arguments, not legal ones. While federal climate legislation 
that constrains and channels state regulatory efforts and common law litigation may be desirable, 
no such legislation has been adopted. To the contrary, Congress has studiously avoided adopting 
meaningful federal climate legislation.183 The only reason federal greenhouse gas regulation 
exists is because the Supreme Court concluded the CAA’s language was capacious enough to 
reach greenhouse gases184--a conclusion the Court has seemed to back away from in subsequent 
cases.185 Given the standards of federal preemption, this is a thin read upon which to find state 
common law climate nuisance cases cannot proceed in court. 
 
                                                 
181 See Elliott et al., supra note __. 
182 See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note __, at 1533-38.  California’s adoption of emission standards for new motor 
vehicles in the 1960s prompted the U.S. auto industry to support federal emission standards that would preempt state 
rules.  See Elliott, et al., supra note __. 
183 See Arnold W. Reitze Jr., Federal Control of Carbon Dioxide Emissions: What Are the Options?, 36 BOST. 
COLL. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 1 (2009), (“From 1999 to [2007], more than 200 bills were introduced in Congress to 
regulate [greenhouse gases], but none were enacted.”). 
184 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (holding greenhouse gases constitute air pollutants subject to 
regulation under the Clean Air Act). 
185 See, e.g., Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014) (limiting the EPA’s authority to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration provisions of the Clean Air Act); Order 
Granting Stay, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15A773, 2016 WL502947 (U.S. Feb. 9, 2016) (granting a stay of the 
EPA’s Clean Power Plan regulating greenhouse gas emissions from power plants). 
DRAFT – Not for Citation  DRAFT – Not for Citation 
  Page 47 
 
 
VI. Preemption of Climate Nuisance Claims 
 
Whether or not nuisance suits represent the most appropriate or effective approach to 
climate change, the lack of meaningful federal action and prospect of substantial climate change-
induced costs prompted a resurgence of climate change litigation by local governments.186 
Because suits under federal common law were foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s AEP 
decision,187 these suits rely upon state-law causes of action, including public and private 
nuisance. Also unlike the claims rejected in AEP, these suits generally seek compensatory 
damages for current and expected costs of climate change and climate adaptation measures. 
Much of the litigation in these cases to date has focused on procedural and jurisdictional 
wrangling, focused in particular on whether these cases belong in state or federal court. The 
defendant fossil fuel companies would like to see these cases dismissed on federal preemption or 
other grounds,188 and have sought to remove cases to federal court where they expect such 
arguments to receive a more sympathetic hearing. One such case, BP P.L.C. v. Mayor and City of 
Baltimore, reached the Supreme Court, but did not produce an opinion that touched on any of the 
substantive claims.189 
Unlike most of the municipal plaintiffs filing state law-based nuisance claims, New York 
City filed its case in federal court. Without the need for wrangling over removal, the district 
                                                 
186 See infra note __ and cases cited therein. 
187 564 U.S. 410 (2011). 
188 Other grounds for dismissal pressed by defendants have included lack of personal jurisdiction and the political 
question doctrine, among others. 
189 See __ U.S. __ (2021) (concluding appellate court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1447(d) to consider all 
grounds for removal raised by defendant). 
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court proceeded to consider (and grant) the defendants’ motions to dismiss on the grounds that 
global warming tort claims may only be pursued under federal law, and that any such claims 
under federal law are displaced by the Clean Air Act.190 Allowing New York City to bring state 
law claims would be “illogical,” Judge John Keenan concluded, given the inherently “interstate 
nature” of the claims.191 Further, to the extent the City’s claims sought to hold defendants liable 
for foreign emissions, allowing them to proceed would potentially implicate questions of foreign 
policy beyond the ken of federal courts.192 
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, citing the “nature 
of the harm and the existence of a complex web of federal and international law” regulating 
greenhouse gas emissions.193 Although, at the time of the case, only a fraction of domestic 
greenhouse gas emissions were subject to federal regulation, and no international agreement 
imposed any binding limits on such emissions at all, the court concluded that allowing New York 
City’s claims to proceed would threaten replacing the “carefully crafted frameworks” of federal 
and international climate regulation with “a patchwork of claims under state nuisance law.”194 
Accordingly, the Second Circuit ordered the claims dismissed.195  
City of New York v. Chevron was the first federal appellate decision to directly consider 
the viability of state law-based nuisance claims. In City of Oakland v. BP PLC, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether similar state-law claims should be removed to 
                                                 
190 City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F.Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).  
191 Id. at 474. 
192 Id. at 475. 
193 City of New York v. Chevron Corp., 81, 85 (2nd Cir. 2021). 
194 Id. at 86. 
195 Id. 
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federal court on the grounds that they arise under federal law for purposes of 28 U.S.C. §1331.196 
In the process of considering this question, the Ninth Circuit considered and rejected the 
defendant fossil fuel companies’ arguments that Oakland’s climate tort claims should be 
considered to raise substantial federal questions197 or were completely preempted by the Clean 
Air Act.198 On this basis, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court had been wrong to 
remove and dismiss the cities’ claims.  
The Second Circuit did not have to consider the question of removal, however, and could 
focus directly on the question of whether federal law allows a municipality to pursue nuisance 
claims against fossil fuel producers for the marketing and sale of fossil fuels and the climate 
change damages that result. From the outset, the Second Circuit’s opinion dismissing NYC’s 
claims makes clear that the court did not consider climate change-related claims to be fit for 
federal judicial resolution, stretching doctrine and the broader legal context to buttress that 
holding. This was accomplished by, among other things, misconstruing the relationship between 
the federal and state governments in environmental law, exaggerating the extent to which climate 
change is subject to regulation under “federal statutory regimes and international treaties,” and 
largely ignoring the lessons of Milwaukee II and Ouellette. 
 Although NYC brought its claims under state law, the Second Circuit’s analysis of the 
claims begins with federal common law, and a strained reading of Milwaukee II. After noting 
that there is no general federal common law post Erie, the Court noted that “specialized federal 
common law” continued to exist in which it continues to “pre-empt and replace” state law where 
                                                 
196 969 F.3d 895 (2020). 
197 Id. at 907. 
198 Id.at 907-08. 
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distinct federal interests or legislative instruction so require.199 Claims based on climate change, 
the Court concluded, necessarily fall into this category because of the cross-boundary nature of 
the alleged harms and the resulting “overriding . . . need for a uniform rule of decision,” quoting 
Milwaukee I.200 In other words, while disclaiming federal common law, the court relied upon 
federal common law to conclude state-law-based claims were preempted, so as to set the stage 
for a displacement analysis. In the process, it omitted consideration of Ouelette’s implicit 
conclusion that a uniform federal rule is unnecessary for the resolution of pollution problems that 
implicate more than one state. 
 To buttress its conclusion that New York City’s claims implicated federal interests, the 
Court reference irrelevant considerations—such as the fact that multiple states filed amicus briefs 
in the case201—and claimed that allowing litigation over fossil fuel production would “upset[] the 
careful balance that has been struck between the prevention of global warming, a project that 
necessarily requires national standards and global participation, on the one hand, and energy 
production, economic growth, foreign policy, and national security, on the other.”202 This is a 
fine list of policy considerations that might inform legislative policy on climate change, but such 
a policy has never been enacted—at least not by Congress—so there is no “careful balance” to be 
preserved. Even assuming the Supreme Court was correct in Massachusetts v. EPA to conclude 
that the greenhouse gases are air pollutants subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act, none of 
                                                 
199 City of New York, 993 F.3d, at 89.  
200 Id. at 91-2. 
201 Among other things, if states (or any other litigants) could alter a court’s consideration of substantive questions 
merely by filing amicus curiae briefs, this would create significant incentives and opportunities for strategic 
behavior to manipulate case outcomes. 
202 City of New York, 993 F.3d, at 93. 
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the relevant statutory provisions were written with greenhouse gases in mind, let alone were 
crafted to strike a “careful balance” between economic and environmental concerns.203 As the 
Second Circuit noted, “the conflict between state law and federal interests must be intractably 
severe before federal common law may spring into action.”204 And yet the Court identified no 
conflict between federal and state law at all, let alone a conflict that could be considered 
“severe.”   
Having concluded that NYC’s claims could only proceed under federal common law, the 
Second Circuit easily reached the conclusion that any such claims are displaced by the Clean Air 
Act. As the Second Circuit saw it, this case was simply AEP round two, despite NYC’s attempt 
to plead state law claims, and because (as the Second Circuit framed the case) the Clean Air Act 
had not authorized NYC’s suit, it was preempted.  
The Second Circuit’s analysis is difficult to square with Ouellette, despite the court’s 
attempts. At issue in Ouellette was an interstate conflict over water pollution, precisely the sort 
of conflict the Supreme Court had held was the proper subject of federal common law in 
Milwaukee I. Under the logic of the Second Circuit’s opinion, the proper approach to the 
Ouellette claims would have been to first, note that the claim was of the sort that should properly 
arise under federal common law, and then second, hold that any such claim is displaced under 
Milwaukee II. That the court did not do this suggests the Second Circuit drew the wrong lessons 
from these cases. 
                                                 
203 See Richard Lazarus, Environmental Law Without Congress, 30 J. LAND USE & ENVTL L. 15 (2014)(“Climate 
change is perhaps the quintessential example of a new environmental problem that the Clean Air Act did not 
contemplate.”). 
204 Id. at 90. 
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Under Ouellette, the displacement of federal common law does not mean that claims of 
an interstate or cross-boundary character are to be dismissed as beyond the province of the 
courts. Rather, under Ouellette, the displacement means that federal common law is unavailable 
to resolve the plaintiff jurisdiction’s claims, so that if a claim is to proceed, it must be viable 
under the applicable state law. Yet that is not the approach the Second Circuit adopted. While the 
Second Circuit was convinced there needed to be a uniform federal law to guide resolution of the 
interstate dispute, Ouellette reached the opposite conclusion, resolving that there is no “neutral” 
federal rule to be had, so states must instead press their claims under the source state’s rules. 
Little in the Second Circuit’s opinion is responsive to this point, other than a brief suggestion 
that a bilateral water pollution dispute of the sort at issue in Ouellete was “more bounded,” and 
thus less threatening to what the Second Circuit imagined was a detailed and carefully balanced 
federal regulatory regime. Yet as noted above, however carefully balanced one believes the 
Clean Air Act may be in its approach to conventional air pollutants, there is nothing in the Act 
representing any sort of conscious legislative balance of the interests implicated by greenhouse 
gas emissions and climate change. Those CAA provisions applicable to greenhouse gases were 
not drafted with an eye toward the control of globally dispersed pollutants.  
The Second Circuit compounded the error by suggesting that whether NYC could press 
state law claims was dependent upon what powers federal law “granted” or “permits” states to 
exercise in environmental law.205 This characterization betrays a fundamental misunderstanding 
of the underlying cooperative federalism framework. Under federal environmental laws, states 
are not “granted” power or discretion to control pollution. Such power preexisted the adoption of 
                                                 
205 Id. at 99.  
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federal pollution control statutes and, on accord of the broad savings clauses, is generally 
preserved, whether such power is exercised through state statutes, regulations, or common law. 
The Clean Air Act does not “permit” or “authorize[]”206 states to adopt their own, more stringent 
air pollution controls, as the Second Circuit claims.207 It rather leaves such preexisting police 
power authority undisturbed. Yet by inverting the structure of federal environmental law—
suggesting that state actions must be authorized or permitted by the federal government—the 
Second Circuit effectively flipped the presumption, enabling it to dispatch NYC’s claims as if 
they were subject to displacement, instead of conducting a more serious and subtle preemption 
analysis. In the process, the Court embraced a degree of phantom federal hegemony that 
devalues the federalism concerns protected by the Supreme Court in Ouellette.  
The Second Circuit had previously rejected preemption defenses against litigation New 
York City and other jurisdictions filed against producers of methyl tertiary butyl ether 
(MTBE).208 As in the climate litigation, the municipal plaintiffs maintained that MTBE’s 
producers had produced, distributed and sold a product with knowledge of the environmental 
harms it could cause.209 And as in the climate cases, the defendants sought to argue that such state 
law claims were preempted by federal law. It is not clear why claims against producers of fossil 
fuels should have been treated differently. 
                                                 
206 Id. at 100. 
207 Other supporters of federal preemption of state-law-based claims have also adopted this erroneous formulation. 
See Damien M. Schiff & Paul Beard II, Preemption ant Midfield: Why the Current Generation of State-Law-Based 
Climate Change Litigation Violates the Supremacy Clause, 49 ENV. L. 853, 881 (2019) (“Congress can authorize 
rather than preclude the states to regulate, as it has done on a cooperative basis to address a hose of environmental 
issues.”). 
208 See In re M.T.B.E. Products Liability Litigation, 725 F.3d 65 (2nd Cir. 2013). 
209 Id. at 82. 
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Some have argued that allowing states to impose liability on emitters or producers of 
fossil fuels would frustrate “Congress’s design,” as it would induce defendants to alter their 
behavior beyond that which is required by federal law.210 It is certainly true that the imposition of 
liability for emissions might have the same effect as the imposition of more stringent state-level 
emission standards on defendants, but this is insufficient to make the point. The CAA does not 
preempt the imposition of more stringent state air pollution controls. To the contrary, consistent 
with most federal environmental laws, the CAA allows states to impose more stringent 
environmental controls on federally regulated facilities, as well as to regulate emissions not 
subject to CAA limitations. Under the “cooperative federalism” model, state authority to use the 
police power to control pollution is left undisturbed, as this was Congress’s express intent. As 
discussed earlier, if a given facility is subject to both federal and state standards, the more 
stringent controls save in those rare instance in which compliance with one standard would 
affirmatively preclude compliance with the other.  
Given that states are allowed to adopt more stringent pollution controls on federally 
regulated facilities, the state’s choice of regulatory instrument should make little difference. 
Whether a state wants to adopt technology mandates through administrative regulation, pollution 
fees, or some form of liability should have no bearing on the preemption question. Nothing in the 
Clean Air Act indicates Congress sought to prevent states from complementing administrative 
regulation with common law or other litigation. As a policy matter, some may believe that the 
                                                 
210 See, Schiff & Beard, supra note __, at 787 (“Imposition of liability for directly emitting or contributing to the 
emission of greenhouse gases otherwise regulated by the Act would, contrary to Congress’s design, require the state-
law-based climate defendants to conform their activities (or be punished for not having conformed their activities) to 
multiple and varying greenhouse gas standards.”). 
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preemption inquiry should track that for displacement.211 But this is not the doctrine, nor has 
Congress legislated such a choice.  
As a legal matter, the lack of preemption of state-law suits concerning conventional air 
pollutants should settle the question. As noted above, the relevant provisions of the Clean Air 
Act were not written to address greenhouse gases. Instead they were written to address 
conventional air pollutants. Given the centrality of legislative intent in the preemption analysis, if 
none of these provisions preempts preempt state-law-based nuisance claims concerning the sorts 
of pollution for which these provisions were crafted, it is hard to see how they could preempt 
other types of pollution which were scarcely on the legislature’s radar. 
The outcome of the Second Circuit’s decision may be desirable as a policy matter. A 
carefully constructed and balanced federal regulatory regime may well be preferable to a bevy of 
state-law-based suits brought by various jurisdictions around the country.212 Yet under existing 
preemption doctrine, not to mention the structure of the Constitution, that is a choice that is to be 
made by the legislature, not the courts. And, the Second Circuit’s blithe characterizations 




 Under existing doctrine, federal common law claims alleging climate-related harms are 
displaced, but state law claims are not preempted. Suits alleging that various activities cause or 
contribute to climate nuisances should rise and fall on other questions and, as noted at the outset, 
                                                 
211 See Richard Epstein [draft, this volume]. 
212 See infra note __ and sources cited therein. 
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there are many concerns that can be raised about such claims under state law. It is also possible 
that the prospect of ongoing climate litigation, if not the threat of climate change itself, will 
eventually prompt the enactment of federal climate legislation that preempts such suits in the 
course of enacting a federal climate policy. But in the meantime, courts should adhere to the 
choices Congress has thus far made, and not find creative ways to displace or preempt state-law-
based nuisance claims that Congress has not yet seen fit to prevent.  
 Much of the Second Circuit’s analysis seems to be driven by the well-founded intuition 
that interstate pollution conflicts, like interstate water disputes, should be governed by federal 
common law. After all, only a federal rule is capable of providing a uniform and neutral rule for 
the resolution of such interstate disputes. This was the approach once embraced by the Supreme 
Court, but since Milwaukee II, the option of using federal common law for the provision of such 
a rule has been take off of the table.  
 It is thus fair to observe that most appropriate judicial means of addressing interstate 
common law claims is unavailable, forcing litigants to rely upon state law, with all of the 
attendant limitations and potential biases. The law of preemption is not the source of the 
anomaly, however, nor has Congress sought to address it. 
 Congress could eventually choose to enact comprehensive measures for the control of 
greenhouse gas emissions, and preempt all state law claims. It could also, if it so chose, reopen 
federal courts to claims based on federal common law.  
 The Court’s rush to displace federal common law nuisance claims in Milwaukee II was 
not clearly grounded in any principled concern for the inherent unworkability of federal common 
law. The Court has adjudicated dozens of interstate environmental claims going back over a 
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century, and did so without much difficulty.213 There is also no problem with allowing continued 
nuisance litigation against the backdrop of environmental regulation. This has been the norm 
under state law the whole time. Sometimes state environmental laws preempt common law 
claims for nuisance or trespass, and sometimes they do not.214 In such cases it is a question of 
what sorts of environmental measures the state legislature enacted and whether such measures 
leave room for the common law. There is no reason the same approach could not be adopted at 
the federal level.  
 The only barrier to such an approach was the Court’s distaste for federal common law. As 
the Court has a times acknowledged, in the absence of applicable legislation, interstate disputes 
properly arise under federal common law, and not the law of either state. This is what the Court 
recognized in the first interstate pollution cases. Since Erie the Court has resisted relying on 
federal common law, and has sought to dispatch it at every opportunity. Yet as some 
commentators have noted, some resort to federal common law is inevitable.215 Unless and until 
Congress has actively and explicitly displaced federal common law, it is questionable the Court 
should do so on its own accord. Relaxing its antipathy for federal common law would further 
allow the Court to adopt parallel standards for preemption and displacement of interstate 
nuisance actions, and apply a consistent principle to interjurisdictional harms. Climate change 
would be as good a context as any in which to take this step. 
                                                 
213 See Cheren, supra note __. 
214 And sometimes such preemption creates takings concerns. See, e.g., Bormann v. Board of Sup'rs In and For 
Kossuth County, 584 N.W. 2d 309 (Iowa 1998) (state law providing immunity from nuisance suits constituted an 
uncompensated taking of property). 
215 See infra  
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 Unless and until the Supreme Court or Congress approves such an approach, and 
precludes further state-law-based litigation, there is no warrant for lower courts to dismiss cases 
on the grounds that they must be displaced or preempted by federal environmental statutes that 
have never been understood to displace or preempt properly pled state common law claims.216 
Whatever the policy merits of clearing the field for federal regulation, neither current doctrine 
nor existing federal statutes support such an approach. While there may be other bases upon 
which to challenge the viability of state common law claims, including due process or the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, statutory preemption or displacement are not among them. Under 
current doctrine, there is nothing in the law of preemption or displacement that to stop such 
claims from proceeding.  
Should policymakers conclude state-law-based tort suits are a poor way to make climate 
policy, they remain free to enact some alternative. Indeed, the proliferation of state-common-law 
suits may well encourage such a step.217 But unless and until they do, claims like those brought 




                                                 
216 It is of course perfectly appropriate for courts to dismiss claims that are not properly grounded in relevant state 
law, or that face other jurisdictional defects. So, for example, it may have been perfectly appropriate for a federal 
district court in California to dismiss climate-based claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. See City of Oakland v. 
BP P.L.C., 2018 WL 3609055 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 
217 See Daniel A. Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change, 155 U. PENN. L. REV. 1605, 1649 
(2007) (“Realistically, the greatest function of litigation may be to prod legislative action.”) 
